The Welfare Hearing Process - The Law and Administrative Regulations Examined by Scott, Robert E.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 11 | Issue 2 Article 3
The Welfare Hearing Process - The Law and
Administrative Regulations Examined
Robert E. Scott
Copyright c 1969 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Robert E. Scott, The Welfare Hearing Process - The Law and Administrative Regulations Examined, 11
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 291 (1969), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss2/3
William and Mary Law Review
VOLUME 11 WIwTER, 1969 NUMBER 2
ARTICLES
THE REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE
'WELFARE HEARING PROCESS-THE NEED FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY
In recent years, the concept of public welfare has undergone sub-
stantial conceptual changes, the primary being a shift from the
older concept of gratuity to one of statutory entitlement pursuant
to the Social Security Act. This paper seeks to examine and ana-
lyze the administrative "fair hearing" as a means of effective regu-
lation of administrative discretion and enforcement of the entitle-
ment provisions of the federal act. Primary emphasis is placed
on a comparative treatment of state hearing procedures and fed-
eral hearing regulations to determine whether the fair hearing is,
at present, a 'mable means of insuring due process in welfare ad-
minstration.
ROBERT E. SCOTT*
I. IrTRoDUcTON
Since the passage of the Social Security Act over thirty-four years
ago,' the public welfare system in the Umted States has grown to
astounding proportions. Soon over ten million Americans will be re-
ceiving payments under one or more of the categorical assistance pro-
* BA., Oberlin College, 1965; J.D., College of William and Mary, 1968; LL.M., Urn-
versity of Michigan, 1969 (W W Cook Fellow). Visiting Instructor m Law, Marshall-
Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary
I. Social Security Act ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
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visions of the federal act.2 Until recently, the social welfare structure
and those who depended on it for their existence were largely ignored
by the legal profession. The rapid growth of public welfare, coupled
with increased concern for the rights of the poor, has produced a
wealth of scholarly research and analysis of the policies and programs
under which public welfare is administered. A part of this laudable
effort has been inquiry into the existing means by which welfare re-
cipients can enforce those rights granted to them by federal and state
legislation as well as challenge federal and state policies which deprive
them of basic constitutional liberties. Among the studies are those ex-
ploring the possibility of seeking federal judicial review,' appeal to the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,4 internal administrative
controls,5 and the direct application of constitutional guarantees and
related federal legislation.6 Largely ignored throughout this process of
examination has been the one adjudicatory procedure established by
the Social Security Act-the administrative "fair hearing." 7
Because of the federal nature of the welfare system, the fair hearing
process varies with each participating state. Consequently, any analysis
of this procedure must undertake to provide a comprehensive study on a
national level. It is the purpose of this article to provide such an analysis
by means of an examination of the hearing procedure as it is defined by
federal law and regulations and as it is actually implemented in the vari-
ous states. Section II deals with an examination of the historical basis for
the fair hearing-the concepts underlying the Social Security Act, the
basic structure of the welfare system and the effect of federal regulations
2. These figures are projected from the nearly eight million recipients currently
receiving categorical assistance. 1967 HEW ANN. REP. 5.
3. Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 84
(1967).
4. Note, Dependent Children and Social Welfare Legislation, 15 J. PuB. L. 349 (1966).
5. Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALiF. L.
REv. 479 (1966).
6. Harvath, Federal Equal Protection and Welfare Assistance, 31 ALBANY L. REv. 210
(1967).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 302 (a) (4) (1964) provides that a state plan must "provide for granting
an opportunity for a fair hearing before the state agency to any individual whose
claim for assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable
promptness." Accord, id. §§ 602(a) (4), 1202(a) (4), 1352(a) (4), 1382(a) (4).
42 U.S.C. § 306(a)(5) (Supp. II, 1968) authorizes federal financial participation in
protection payments only with respect to a State whose State plan includes provision
for "opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency on the determination [of
need for protective payments] for any individual with respect to whom it is made."
Accord, id. §§ 606(a)(E), 1206(5), 1355(5), 1385(a)(E).
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promulgated pursuant to it. A review of the possible means of enforcing
rights and correcting state policy is included with a view to clearly
stating the problem which is presented in the following section. Sec-
tion III undertakes the analysis of the federal hearing requirements
and the extent to which the states comply. Section IV is devoted to an
assessment of the state hearing regulations, an analysis of their provi-
sions, and proposals and recommendations for reform feasible within
the existing welfare structure.
II. Tim BAsIS AND STRUCTURE OF CATEGORICAL AssIsTANCE
-THE PROBLEM STATED
A. Historical Background.
Prior to the enactment of the Social Security Act, the burden of
welfare assistance remained in large measure the responsibility of pri-
vate relief organizations. Although some states did have state-wide
or local welfare programs, the extent of state contribution to those
who could not support themselves was comparatively low.8 It is not
surprising, therefore, that during this period the poor, individually
and collectively, were perceived not as "rights claimers" but as "alms
seekers." 9 They accepted with humble gratitude whatever was given
to them, having been taught "not to bite feeding hands, lest fodder
be wholly denied." 10
The Social Security Act represented a marked departure from the
old welfare "dole" philosophy. The Act, in establishing a program
for nation-wide participation of government in the relief of economic
distress, recognized for the first time the principle that "the national
interest requires that all people have sufficient income to provide for a
living standard of health and well-being." 11 This concept of statutory
entitlement,12 though it has been substantially ignored in the adminis-
8. U. S. D'T OF HEALTH, EUcATIoN AN WELFA E, A CONSTRuCTvE PUBLIc WELFARE
PRoG.RAM iii (1965).
9. Gellhorn, Poverty and Legality, the Law's Slow Awakening, 9 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 285 (1967).
10. Id. at 287.
11. U. S. DE'r OF HEALTH, aDUCATION AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PuBLIc AsSISTANCE
ADMIMSTRATION pt. I, 2000(1) (1968) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].
12. The concept of "entitlement' based on the theory that dependency is a condition
ordinarily beyond the control of the individual, and that welfare benefits are rights,
based on the notion that everyone is entitled to a share of the common wealth, has been
popularized by Professor Charles A. Reich of Yale University. E.g., Reich, Individual
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965);
1969]
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tration of public assistance,13 finds specific recognition in the Social
Security Act. Section 2 (a) 8 provides that a state must
provide that all individuals wishing to make application for as-
sistance under the plan shall have opportunity to do so, and that
such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to
all eligible individuals.14
The full implications of this provision to the concept of the fair
hearing can be understood only if one recognizes that unless the fair
hearing provision of the Act is based on the right of each individual to
apply and receive assistance, there are no grounds for asserting that avail-
able adjudicatory procedures must comply with expressed standards of
administrative requirements and federal law. Finding, however, the clear
concept of right enshrined in the enabling legislation, it cannot be denied
that the fair hearing procedures as they are constituted in the various
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Reich, Social Welfare in the
Public-Private State, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 487 (1966).
Although Professor Reich popularized this concept and must be acknowledged as its
author, the theory of "statutory entitlement" in reality finds its basis in the Social
Security Act.
13. The evidence is overwhelming that the states administering public assistance
programs have continued to regard the welfare client as a recipient of charity and
have conditioned benefits on numerous restrictive eligibility requirements, including
residency periods, maximum payments, suitable home requirements, substitute parent
doctrines and the requirement of employment under adverse circumstances. In addition,
the determination of need is based largely on the "means" test which entails an ex-
haustive check on income and resources available to the claimant, as well as scrutiny of
the claimants' private affairs so as to detect any change in needs or available source of
income. These practices have been fully analyzed and criticized by numerous studies
and articles. E.g., Handler & Rosenheim, Privacy in Welfare, Public Assistance and
Juvenile justice, 31 LAw & CoNTEMP. PaoB. 377 (1966) (means test); Reich, Midnight
Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347 (1963) (interference
with personal liberty); Note, Residence Requirements in State Public Welfare Statutes,
51 IowA L. REv. 1080 (1966) (residency tests); Note, Dependent Children and Social
Welfare Legislation, 15 J. Pun. L. 349 (1966) (the substitute father doctrine).
Largely through the efforts of concerned segments of the legal profession a number
of these restrictive and debilitating policies have been ordered abandoned either by
the courts or the federal agency. The reason these practices have been allowed to con-
tinue at all rests largely on the structure of the public assistance system. Under the
federal act, standards of dependency are left to be developed primarily by the states.
The federal administrative requirements are more concerned that "such standards are
uniform throughout the state, systematic and complete than they are about the specific
provisions of the state plan." HEW, REPoRT oF TE ADvisoRY Couucm oN PUBLIc Wu.-
FARE 26 (1966).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 302(a) (8) (1969) (emphasis added). Accord, id. §S 602(a) (10) (Supp.
IV, 1968), 1202 (a) (11), 1352 (a) (10).
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states must provide substantial procedural protection to aggrieved indi-
viduals.15
B. The Structure of Public Assistance.
The Social Security Act was originally enacted August 14, 1935, and
has been frequently amended by subsequent acts of Congress. The pre-
amble of the Act as originally enacted reads as follows:
To provide for the general welfare by establishing a system
of Federal old-age benefits, and by enabling the several States to
make more adequate provision for aged persons, blind persons,
dependent and crippled children, maternal and child welfare,
public health, and the administration of their unemployment com-
pensation laws; to establish a Social Security Board; to raise reve-
nues; and for other purposes.'
Under the public assistance titles of the Act,17 the federal government
provides substantial financial support for categories of needy persons.
These programs include Old Age Assistance (OAA), Aid to the
Blind (AB), Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (AD), Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),1 8 and general Medical
Assistance (Medicare).:19
The public assistance programs are administered by the states with
grants-in-aid from the federal government. To secure federal financial
support, a state must submit a "plan" for a particular program, and have
the plan approved by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.20
In order to meet the approval of the Secretary, a state plan must pro-
vide, inter alia, "for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before
the State agency to any individual whose claim for assistance under the
plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness." 21 To-
15. This concept and related issues are more fully explored in Section IV infra.
16. Social Security Act § 1, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq., 601 et seq., 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et seq. (1964).
18. This title has been changed to Aid and Services to Needy Families with De-
pendent Children, but to avoid possible confusion, the old denomination of AFDC will
be used throughout this paper.
19. Recent amendments emphasize the provision of preventive and rehabilitative
services "to strengthen family life and to promote self-support and self-care." HA1I-
Boon pt. I, 3000. "States are encouraged to provide incentives to the recipients of
public assistance to improve their condition and to prepare children for adult re-
sponsibilities." Id.
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301, 601, 1201, 1351, 1381 (1964).
21. Id. § 302(a)4. Accord, id. §§ 602(a)4, 1202(a)4, 1352(a)4, 1382 (a)4.
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gether with the hearing requirement, the plan must provide "such
methods of administration as are found by the Secretary to be neces-
sary and proper for the proper and efficient operation of the plan." '
In addition to the statutory standards, H.E.W. has added the require-
ment that classifications imposed by a state plan, especially eligibility
criteria more restrictive than those obtainable under the federal statutes,
must be "rational . . . in light of the purposes of public assistance
programs." 23
The Secretary of H.E.W. is required under the Act to discontinue
federal aid to state programs which he finds, after a hearing, do not con-
form to the federal requirements,2 4 but there is no established procedure
for aggrieved individuals to request or compel such action.Y2 As indi-
cated above, other adjudicatory procedures including federal judicial
review,26 state court mandamus actions27 and enforcement of the Social
Security Act and H.E.W. regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as "rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the ... laws" of the United States,
have been proposed as possible means of enforcing rights under the cate-
gorical assistance programs.28 Whether or not any or all of these pro-
cedures will eventually be recognized by the courts, the fact remains
that the only viable existing procedure that is universally recognized as a
means for enforcing the rights of welfare recipients is the administrative
fair hearing.
22. Id. § 302(a) (5) (Supp. Ii, 1968).
23. See A. Wilcox, General Counsel, HEW "Memorandum Concerning Authority
of the Secretary Under Title IV to Disapprove Michigan Home Bill # 145" (March
25, 1963). HEW has given this doctrine the name "Condition X." See generally Note,
WE.FARE'S CoNDITIoN X, 76 YALE L.J. 1222 (1967).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 304, 604, 1204, 1354, 1384 (1964).
25. Only one conformity hearing has been held since June, 1961 (that was held April
5, 1966 and involved Alabama's alleged failure to administer its programs without
racial discrimination) and efforts by aggrieved claimants to petition the Secretary to
hold a hearing in order to examine allegedly restrictive state policy have been dismissed
for lack of standing. See generally Note, Dependent Children and Social Welfare
Legislation, 15 J. PuB. L. 349 (1966).
26. Note, supra note 3.
27. The welfare statutes of many states provide that state welfare agencies shall
conform to federal requirements. See, e.g., MIc. STAT. ANN. 400.10 (1967). It has been
argued that these statutes incorporated federal requirements so that they are enforceable
as state law. In support of this position, see Pearson v. State Social Welfare Bd., 54 Cal.
2d 184, 353 P.2d 33 (1960); Fenton v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 132 N.E.2d 528
(Mass. 1962); State v. Brandjord, 108 Mont. 417, 92 P.2d 273 (1939); Multnomah County
v. Luihn, 178 P.2d 159 (Ore. 1947); Morgan v. Department of Social Security, 14 Wash.
2d 156, 127 P.2d 686 (1942).
28. Note, supra note 3, at 109-15.
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C. The Nature and Effect of Federal Regulations Under the Social Se-
curity Act.
Section 1102 of the Social Security Act authorizes the Secretary of
H.E.W. to "make and publish such rules and regulations, not inconsistent
with this Act, as may be necessary to the efficient administration of
the functions with which [he] is charged under this Act." 2o The Secre-
tary has delegated his authority to interpret and enforce the federal re-
quirements and to publish regulations consistent with that purpose to
the Administrator of the Social and Rehabilitation Service. 0 The Ad-
ministrator, in the exercise of this delegated statutory authority, has pub-
lished the Handbook of Public Assistance Administration. Regulations
relevent to the public assistance programs are set forth in the
Handbook and are made available to all state agencies administering or
supervising programs under the public assistance titles. The regulations
are promulgated in the form of interpretations of the Social Security
Act, requirements for state plans, criteria for administration of state
plans, conditions for federal financial participation, and recommenda-
tions for improving public assistance programs and administration., New
regulations and policy revisions are brought to the attention of the states
through Handbook Transmittals and Interim Policy Statements, and are
either mandatory or permissive. Mandatory requirements are deemed to
be essential under the law. The test of essentiality is whether or not the
state could comply with the relevant statutory provisions without meet-
ing such requirements.82
Until recently the legal force and effect of the regulations and re-
quirements issued in the Handbook had been in some doubt. How-
ever, in the case of King v. Smith,88 which overturned Alabama's "sub-
stitute father" regulation, the Supreme Court ruled that state plans of
public assistance "must conform with several requirements of the Social
Security Act and witb rules and regulations promulgated by H.E.W." 81
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1964) (emphasis added).
30. Formerly the Commissioner of Welfare Administration.
31. HANDBOOK pt. 1, 4210.
32. Id. 4210(2).
33. 392 U.S. 309 (1968). By deciding the case on the basis of the Social Security Act,
the Court found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether the regulation was
constitutionally defective under the equal protection clause.
'While King bars the use of a substitute father or man-in-the-house rule as an eligi-
bility test," the Court decision leaves open the question concerning the use of such
rules as a means test. 13 WhlrrBaa L. BulL. 2 (1968).
34. 392 U.S. at 317 (emphasis added).
1969]
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Following the rules established by the Court in King, it is now clear
that the states must comply with all the mandatory hearing regulations
promulgated by H.E.W. to avoid violating the Social Security Act.
Since these regulations have the force of law, non-compliance by the
states would constitute a clear violation of the "laws" which "secured"
rights, privileges, and immunities to individuals within the meaning of
42 U. S. C. § 1983. Thus, a claim for redress under Section 1983 exists
against those responsible for state welfare practices which causes a dep-
rivation of the rights so secured.
D. The Significance of the Hearing Process.
Since the legal profession has awakened, at last, to those policies
prevalent in welfare administration which in large measure restrict the
rights and personal freedoms of the recipients and applicants, concern
has focused on methods of enforcing those rights and overturning those
policies which arguably violate the Constitution and the Social Security
Act. It is not within the scope of this paper to analyze the nature of these
policies and the efforts that have been made to have them changed. It
is sufficient that there is general recognition of a need for an effective
means of enforcing rights in relation to both individual decisions and
universally applicable policies.
As indicated above, the only universal means of enforcing the rights
of welfare recipients that is presently available is through the adminis-
trative fair hearing procedures authorized under the Social Security Act.
The administrative fair hearing is not an unknown quantity. Over the
past thirty years a large body of experience and law has been established
with respect to hearing regulations in administrative agencies which un-
dertake regulation of economic affairs. The experience of other govern-
ment agencies has proven that, given the necessary procedural guaran-
tees, the fair hearing can be an accepted and effective means of chal-
lenging agency policy and enforcing established rights.35 The practices
of other agencies has made possible the identification of standards which
characterize this process. These standards have established, inter alia,
that: (1) the rules on which the grounds of decision are based are clearly
formulated in advance of any action;36 (2) the proposed rules should
35. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74
YALE L.J. 1245, 1252 (1965).
36. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964). "Every agency
shall separately state and currently publish ... substantive rules adopted as authorized
by law ... " See generally K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATVE LAW 130 (1960); Reich, supra
note 35.
[Vol. 11: 291
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be available for public comment prior to their promulgation;37 (3) prior
to any action there is actual notice of the proposed action and a com-
plete statement of the basis for it;"' (4) the pertinent facts are established
in a proceeding at which the aggrieved individual can be apprised of
the evidence and have an opportunity to rebut it; factual findings are
based on non-hearsay testimony given in open proceedings; 0 (5) the
aggrieved individual has the right and opportunity to be represented by
counsel;40 (6) there is a clear separation between those who investigate
and institute actions and those who hear the facts and make the deci-
sion; 41 (7) the decision should be based on expressed findings and pub-
lished reasons;42 and (8) there is an opportunity for review of the de-
cision by the agency and the courts.43
On the basis of these procedures which are established practice in
other administrative agencies, it has been persuasively argued that a
welfare hearing process which incorporated many of these procedures
would similarly serve as an effective means of enforcing rights and
establishing the correctness of administrative decisions.44 This argument,
however, has not won universal acceptance. There are those who con-
tend that this "full adjudicatory procedure" is not relevant to the ad-
ministration of public assistance, that a full group of procedural rights
37. See, Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1964): "[Tlhe agency
shall afford interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through
submission of written data, views, or arguments." K. DAvis, supra note 36, at 124:
"Informal written or oral consultations with affected parties is the mainstay of rule.
making procedure." See also Reich, supra note 35.
38. Administrative Procedure Act § 9, 5 U.S.C. 1008 (1964). This is based on the
theory expressed in Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117
(1926), that due process requires that the aggrieved individual have an opportunity
to rebut and explain the evidence against him. See K. DAVIs, supra note 36, at 168;
Reich, supra note 35.
39. See, e.g., the hearing procedures established in Administrative Procedure Act, § 7,
5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1964); Reich, supra note 35.
40. Administrative Procedure Act, § 6, 5 U.S.C. S 1005 (1964).
41. Administrative Procedure Act § 5, 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1964). "No officer ... engaged
in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions . . . shall . . . participate
or advise in the decision. . . ." Reich, supra note 35.
42. Administrative Procedure Act § 8, 5 U.S.C. § 1007 (1964), "All decisions . . .
shall ... include a statement of (1) findings and conclusions, as well as the reasons or
the basis therefor ... ." Reich, supra note 35.
43. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. S 1009 (1964). "Any person suffering
legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such
action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review
thereof." Reich, supra note 35.
44. See Reich, supra note 35.
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are of little use to the welfare client who must continue to deal in the
future with the welfare caseworker who made the original contested
decision, and that fear of alienation and reprisal will prevent implementa-
tion of these procedural guarantees.45 Those who advocate this position
emphasize instead that enforcement of the rights of welfare recipients
can be best effected through administrative and legislative reform which
is capable of attacking the discretionary and permissive areas of wel-
fare administration. Thus, it is argued that by strengthening the adminis-
trative system we can create conditions under which officials will be
more receptive to fulfilling legislative and administrative requirements."
A superficial response to this latter argument is that, although there
is a need for better administration of public assistance, legislative and
administrative reform are long term goals. Over the short term it is
necessary to enforce those rights already available to the recipients and
the only established means available for that purpose is the fair hearing.
Further, it is arguable that improved and effective hearing procedures
will not cause welfare caseworkers and administrators to retaliate in
future dealings with the recipient. Rather it might cause officials to be
more careful in future dealings to ensure the recipient the full measure
of his rights in order to avoid the necessity of additional hearings re-
quiring the official to justify his decision in an open and impartial forum.
All these arguments, however, proceed from a lack of understand-
ing of the existing nature and provisions of the hearing process in wel-
fare administration. Before judgments on these and other questions can
validly be made, it is necessary to gain some insight into the welfare
hearing process as it is presently constituted. A complete review and
analysis of this process has not been undertaken to date, and conse-
quently much of the legal commentary proposing alternative methods
of rights enforcement has of necessity proceeded from ignorance of
the hearing system. To provide a basis for future judgments, the fol-
lowing sections will undertake an analysis of the fair hearing as it is
reflected in the regulations of the federal agency and those of the vari-
ous states.47
45. See Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, LAw OF
ThM POOR 158 (1966). Professor Handler responds directly to Professor Reich's call
for an effective hearing process by asserting that procedural rights will not reach the
problem of causing welfare officials to implement national and state legislative goals.
Id. at 170.
46. Id. at 176.
47. See Reich, supra note 35, at 1256.
[Vol. 11:291
WELFARE HEARING PROCESS
III. THm FEDERAL HEARING REQUImEMNTS AND STATE REGULATIONS
COMPARED-Do THjE STATES COMPLY?
A. General Description.
The Social Security Act provides that, a state plan must
provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before the
State agency to any individual whose claim for [aid or] assistance
under the plan is denied or is not acted upon' with reasonable
promptness.4
In accordance with its delegated statutory responsibility to promul-
gate regulations pursuant to the Act, the Social and Rehabilitation Ser-
vice (formerly the Welfare Administration) of H.E.W. has issued a
series of rules designed to govern the conduct of the fair hearing by
the participating state agencies.49 These rules are in the form of require-
ments for state plans,50 criteria for the administration of the plans,8 '
interpretation of the requirements,52 and statements outlining those pro-
grams and policies in which federal financial participation is available.5 8
Furthermore, many states, in addition to the enabling legislation direct-
ing the state agency to conform to the several requirements of the So-
cial Security Act in order to secure the necessary federal financial aid
for their public assistance programs, have similar statutes requiring the
provision for a fair hearing by the responsible state agency.5 4 Pur-
suant to the Federal Act and regulations thereunder, as well as their
own applicable state legislation, every state agency administering pub-
lic assistance has promulgated regulations designed to control and
direct the institution and conduct of the fair hearing process.
Prior to an examination and analysis of the federal and state regu-
lations governing fair hearings, it is necessary to describe the context
in which the procedure is implemented. An individual who first makes
48. 42 U.S.C. § 302(a) (4) (1964). Accord, id. §§ 602(a) (4), 1202(a) (4), 1352(a) (4),
1382 (a) (4). For similar fair hearing provisions with specific relevance to protective
payments, see note 7, supra.
49. HAmNooK pt. IV, 6000-999.
50. Id. 6200.
51. Id. 6300.
52. Id. 6400.
53. Id. 6500.
54. See, e.g., MicH. CoMp. LAws A.. §§ 400.56-57 (1967); TExAs Ray. Civ. STAT.
ANw. art. 695(c), §§ 16-c, 25(1) (1964).
1969]
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application for public assistance under a federally approved plan be-
gins at the "intake" procedure which processes and categorizes new
applicants for assistance. 5 Assuming compliance with federal stand-
ards, the applicant is given appropriate notice at this time of his rights
under the Act, including the right to a fair hearing. The same no-
tice requirement exists at any future date when the applicant or re-
cipient is advised of any decision affecting his receipt of assistance.
Throughout this initial process, and continuing indefinitely if his re-
quest is granted, the client's only contact with the agency is with the
caseworker employed by the local county or regional office.56 It is the
caseworker who is charged with the function of fulfilling the notice
requirements, attempting to resolve and satisfy client dissatisfaction, and
who ultimately initiates the hearing process when a request for a hear-
ing is made. 7
Upon the initiation of such a request, the local administrators and
supervisors as well as a representative of the state office become in-
volved. The responsibility for the conduct of the hearing and the ful-
fillment of those requirements which follow upon such an action rests
with the state agency."' However, in most instances the caseworker
continues to be involved through the submission of a summary of the
local office's position and the action taken pursuant thereto. Further-
more, in many states, the caseworker, alone or in conjunction with
local supervisory personnel, is charged with presenting the case for the
county agency at the hearing.59 Because this division of responsibility
within the agency often affects the nature of the regulations promul-
gated by the states, it is necessary to keep in mind the context in which
the regulations are operable during the analysis and comparison of
the hearing provisions.
As indicated earlier, the federal regulations have established require-
ments governing the procedures by which the states implement the
fair hearing provision of the Social Security Act. The fact that these
requirements are deemed essential under the law 60 does not, however,
automatically insure that the administrative hearings available in the
states comply with the federal regulations. Consequently, the follow-
55. Welfare Caseworker Interview.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See note 32 supra.
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ing sub-sections will analyze these requirements in an attempt to de-
termine: (1) what the federal regulations require; (2) what the states
provide; and (3) the extent of compliance with the federal rules.
B. State Agency Responsibility.
Because the Social Security Act permits various kinds of state ad-
ministration of public assistance, including state supervision of local
administration, it is essential that the federal regulations identify the
source of responsibility for the hearing process within the state. To
insure some measure of state-wide uniformity, the regulations pro-
vide that "[T]he State agency will be responsible for fulfillment of
fair hearing provisions, and shall specify the hearing authority." 01
It is not surprising, in view of the nature of this provision, that
every one of the fifty states participating in the public assistance pro-
gram has implemented this provision and fully complied with the fed-
eral requirement. Pursuant to their assumption of responsibility for the
fulfillment of the fair hearing provisions,62 all state agencies have is-
sued administrative regulations which are intended to establish the
necessary fair hearing procedures to be followed by the local and
state welfare officials. 3
To implement the second part of this provision, the state welfare
agencies have designated the hearing authority within the agency who
is charged with rendering the final administrative decision. Because
of the wide latitude permissible under the federal requirement, there is
considerable variety in the nature of the hearing authority among the
states. The majority of states have designated the State Director or
chief administrative officer of the welfare agency as the appropriate
hearing authority.64 Others have rested the final decision-making au-
thority on the State Welfare Board which generally serves a policy-
61. HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6200 (a).
62. Handbook Transmittal No. 140 (Feb. 8, 1968).
63. The former federal provision required only that the state must provide "for
specific designation of responsibility within the agency for conduct of hearings." Hand-
book Transmittal No. 56 (Sept. 9, 1965).
64. E.g., CALIFoRNIA DEPARTMENT OF SocIAL W_YARE MANuAL 22-069(1) (1968);
IDAHO MANUAL OF OPERATING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ch. 3, § 3385.1 (1960); INDIANA
PuuLic ASSirANcE MAxUAL tit XII, § IH(C) (1963); MmANE PUBLIC AssIsTANcE PAYMENTS
MAN-uAL ch. I, § c, p. 4 (1968); MARYLAND PUBLIC AssIsTANcE MANuAL § 225.5 (1964);
MAssAcuszrrs PUBLIC AssriANCE POLIcY MANUAL, ch. IV, § 3(a) (1968); MICHIGAN
MANUAL OF SocIAL SERvicEs pt. H, § 389 (1949).
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making and advisory function to the agency.65 A few states have re-
jected this approach and have designated either a specially created Ap-
peals Committee 6  or the Hearing Officer himself6 7 as the final au-
thority.
Although all these provisions comply with the rather general re-
quirement of the federal regulations, a strong argument can be made
that to avoid inconsistency with other federal provisions, the hearing
authority should be one who is also charged with the policy making
functions of the state agency. In some states the State Administrator
is equally charged by law with the duty of formulating policy for the
department, and in these instances final decision by him or his desig-
nated agent presents no potential conflict. However, in a number of
states where the hearing authority is the State Administrator, the policy
making functions of the agency remain with the State Board.68 In these
instances it would seem impossible for the hearing authority, who is
not charged with promulgating or deciding policy, to hear and decide
the validity of a policy claim. As a consequence, the state agency might
be unable to comply with those federal requirements authorizing ap-
peals based on agency policy, regardless of regulations to the contrary.
Thus, although all the states are in literal compliance with federal
law in the designation of a hearing authority, in some instances conflicts
with other provisions may result in potential violations.
C. Grounds for Requesting a Fair Hearing-The Policy Appeal.
Under the federal regulations a state plan must provide that:
An opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency will
be granted to any individual requesting a hearing because his claim
65. ARIZONA PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL 3-12073 (1965) (State Board of Public Wel-
fare); CoLoRADo PUBLIC ASSISTANCE MANUAL §4724.1 (1968) (State Welfare Board);
FLORIDA MANUAL OF PUBLIC WELFARE ch. 100, § V (1967) (State Board); ILLnNois CATE-
GORICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § IV (1963) (Illinois Public Aid Commission); IowA DE-
PARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE MANUAL VI-13.1 (1966) (State Board of Social Welfare).
66. ARKANSAS DPW MANUAL § 6350.1 (1968) (The Committee on Fair Hearings);
DELAWARE PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL § 5910(n) (1967) (Appeal Board); KANSAS PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 5370 (1956) (Appeals Committee); KErUCKY PUmc ASSISTANCE
MANUAL OF OPERATION § 4300 (1967) (Appeal Board).
67. E.g., CONECTICUT PUBLIC ASSISTANCE MANUAL vol. I, § 6090(1) (1968); HAWAn
PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL § 2503 (9) (1968).
68. E.g., California, Indiana, Kansas and Louisiana. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STATE
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PLANS UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, U.S. DER'T OF H.E.W.,
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE REPORT No. 50 (1962).
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for assistance is denied, is not acted upon with reasonable prompt-
ness, or because he is aggrieved by any other agency action affect-
ing his receipt or termination of assistance, or by agency policy
as it affects his situation69
The federal agency has interpreted this provision to require a fair
hearing which will include: (1) consideration of any action on a claim
for assistance which involves undue delay in reaching a decision on
eligibility, making a payment, refusal to consider a request, making an
adjustment in payment or on suspension or discontinuance of eligibility;
(2) consideration of all agency decisions regarding eligibility, amount
of assistance, manner or form of payment, and conditions of payment,
including work requirements; and (3) consideration of the agency's
interpretation of the law, and the reasonableness and suitableness of the
policies pro nulgated under the law, if the claimant is aggrieved by
them."'
The requirement outlining the grounds for appeal taken in con-
junction with the interpretive provisions establish the federal policy
that an appeal can be taken by an applicant or recipient under any
circumstances in which the claimant feels aggrieved by agency action
or inaction regardless of the basis for such action. The requirements
are inclusive and pervasive. They are intended to allow a hearing re-
quest under any conceivable circumstances and to forbid the state
agencies from in any way restricting this fundamental right.7 1
With regard to the more traditional grounds for requesting a hear-
ing-eligibility, amount of assistance, termination, delay,-the state regu-
lations have little difficulty. Forty-eight states72 have provisions allow-
ing clients to institute an appeal on the basis of these fundamental
69. HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6200(b) (emphasis added).
70. Id. 6300(c) (1)-(3) (emphasis added). This requirement remained unchanged
in the February 1968 revisions with one significant exception; the provision for policy
appeals which had previously been found only in the interpretive provisions of the
regulations was made a specific and express requirement for state plans.
71. This fact is emphasized in the interpretive provisions of the regulations which
state:
The claimant's freedom to request a hearing, whenever he believes that
proper consideration has not been given to all the circumstances surrounding
his claim is a fundamental right... [Elvery aggrieved claimant is entitled
to the opportunity for a hearing.
HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6400(a).
72. California and Massachusetts have no provision in their regulations specifying
permissable grounds for appeal. See Appendix infra.
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grounds. The provisions are generally complete in this respect and fully
comply with stated federal policy.7
Substantial non-compliance is found, however, with the single most
significant ground of all, the policy appeal. Because of the possibility of
agency policies and practices which restrict the full exercise of a
claimant's right to public assistance payments, a means of appeal where-
by the client is afforded an opportunity to challenge agency policy
and interpretation of the law is of utmost importance. The significance
of the policy appeal has not been lost on the federal agency. Not only
is a policy appeal an explicit requirement for all state plans, but such
grounds are further emphasized in other sections of the regulations.4 It
is clear that policy appeal provisions remain at the cornerstone of an
effective hearing procedure. Without this provision, or one sub-
stantially comparable, the states will have significantly reduced the
scope of the fair hearing as an effective remedy for aggrieved claim-
ants.
An analysis of the hearing regulations of the various states discloses
a failure to achieve substantial compliance with this provision by a ma-
jority of those administering categorical assistance.
FIGURE 1-THE POLICY APPEAL
States in Some Violative
Substantial Provision But No Provision or Undetermined
Compliance Insufficient at All Restrictive
Number of
States 17 8 20 1 4
Percentage 34% 16% 40% 2% 8%
73. For a typical example of the state provisions in this regard, see FLORIDA MANUAL
OF PuBLIC WELuFR ch. 100, § V (1967):
The client shall . . . be advised that he may request a hearing when he
believes any of the following conditions exist:
(a) When opportunity to make application has been denied;
(b) When application has been rejected;
(c) When application has not been acted upon within a reasonable length
of time as provided by agency policy for action on applications;
(d) When grant is inadequate, or inequitable in relation to agency stand-
ards of assistance;
(e) When grant has been modified, or discontinued;
(f) When reconsideration is refused or delayed.
74. See note 70 supra.
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Only seventeen states have provisions which achieve substantial com-
pliance with the federal regulations.7 5 In several of the states complying,
the emphasis on the freedom to question agency policy is clear. For
example, the RHODE IsLAND PUBLIC AssisTANCE SERVICE MANUAL pro-
vides that the major objectives of the fair hearing process are, inter alia
[to] reveal aspects of agency policy that are inequitable or con-
stitute a misinterpretation of the law; to submit policy to scrutiny
and discussion; and to furnish the agency with evidence indicat-
ing the need for modification of policies and procedures and the
nature of the needed modification."
It continues with the statement that "[t]his provision [regarding the
basis of a request for a fair hearing] is intended to be broad and to
include questions on the agency action itself, on the failure to act, or
on the policy under 'which the action 'was taken." 77
Few of the complying states go as far as this in emphasizing the
availability of an appeal based entirely on agency policy, but their
failures are less significant in view of the number of states with in-
sufficient provisions, 8 or with no provisions at all. 9 Together, these
two groupings comprise a majority of the participating states in which
the policy appeal is not available in any substantial degree to an
aggrieved claimant. Although it might be argued that in the absence
of a provision prohibiting policy appeals such grounds are still avail-
able, in at least one jurisdiction that argument has been decisively pre-
cluded. The Alabama regulations provide that during the conduct of the
hearing "the hearing officer will not hear complaints or arguments
about Federal and State laws or policies." 80 Although none of the
other states have provisions which so clearly prohibit the institution of
75. For a list of the provisions in each state, see Appendix infra.
76. RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC AssisTAwcE SEWcE MANUAL ch. IV, Fair Hearings, § I(E)
(1963).
77. Id. § 11 (emphasis added).
78. For an example of states which give some indication of the right to a policy
appeal, but whose provisions are inadequate, see K -rucKy PULIc AsslsrANcE MANUAL
OF OPRAmTION § 4005(9) (1968), which includes among appealable issues, "[amny other
issue that has adversely affected his claim." For a better provision than this, though
still inadequate, see KANsAs PUBuC AssiSrANcE MANUAL § 5323.1(7) (1956), which
provides that an applicant may appeal if "dissatisfied with any other policy or action
or failure to act with respect to his complaint." For a list of states with insufficient
provisions for policy appeals, see Appendix infra.
79. See Appendix infra.
80. ALIABAMA PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL Pt. I, §§ 1,1 (2) (1968).
19691
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
an appeal challenging agency policy, the fact that no such grounds
are recognized in the state regulations would seem to effectively pre-
clude this basis for an appeal.
This analysis confirms that which has previously been asserted-many
states do not consider the fair hearing a forum for the consideration of
legal questions.8' This failure is not an insignificant one in terms of the
efficacy of the fair hearing process. In many instances, agency policy,
not the decision made pursuant to that policy, is the only grounds for
complaint by the claimant. Unless he can challenge the policy itself he
cannot prosecute an appeal against a decision which adheres to that
policy."' In such instances, which may constitute the major grounds for
grievance,83 the claimant is denied recourse to the fair hearing pro-
cedure in clear violation of the federal law.
D. Notice Requirements.
Perhaps no other provision of the federal regulations is as important
to an effective hearing procedure as the requirement that the claimant
be given full and adequate notice of his rights in the fair hearing process.
The federal regulations provide that:
Every claimant will be informed in writing at the time of
application and at the time of any agency action affecting his
claim
(1) of his right to a fair hearing;
(2) of the method by which he may obtain a hearing;
(3) that he may be represented by others including legal coun-
sel; and
(4) of any provision for payment of legal fees by the agency.8
The significance accorded this provision by the federal regulations
is emphasized in subsequent provisions which more fully explain the
content of the notice procedure.85 The notice requirement has been
81. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION IN LAW AND POVERTY, HANDBOOK OF WELFARE
LAW, at 20:1 (1968).
82. Interview with George Stewart, Attorney, Legal Aid Clinic, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
Feb. 10, 1969.
83. Id.
84. This and the following provision regarding payment of legal fees are new,
having been transmitted to the states along with the other revisions on Feb. 8, 1968.
It is consistent with other new provisions emphasizing the role of the attorney in the
hearing process. See Section V infra.
85. See H -DBOOK pt. IV, 6300(j):
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interpreted under the federal rules as requiring oral explanation as well
as written notice at the designated times. Regulations provide that
written notification of the right to a hearing may be on the application
form and on other forms used by the agency in communications with
applicants and recipients as well as on explanatory pamphlets distributed
by the agency. 6 Emphasis is given to the fact that oral explanations
should also be made at intake and at the time of any subsequent change
in eligibility. The full thrust of these and related provisions is to clearly
establish that the notice requirements, both written and oral, are de-
signed "to assure that the claimant fully understands this right. This
right is further assured by the agency explaining the right to a hearing
in understandable terms and in being helpful as needed in the prepara-
tion for and conduct of the hearing." 7
The federal notice requirements contain three elements necessary
for full compliance: (1) there must be notice of the right to a hearing;
FGuE 2-NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Some
States Provision No Violates Unde-
States Which But Provision or termined
Comply Insufficient at All Restricts
No. 39 1 7 0 3
Right to Hearing
% 78% 2% 14% 0 6%
No. 11 4 22 0 3
Right to Attorney
% 22% 8% 44% 0 6%
Emphasis on No. 21 4 22 0 3
Explanation
% 42% 8% 44% 0 6%
Complete Notice No. 9 31 7 0 3
Provision
% 18% 62% 14% 0 6%
Written notification and, to the extent possible, oral explanation of the
right to and procedure for requesting a fair hearing are given at the time of
application. Written notice, and oral explanation as necessary, are given at
the time of any agency action affecting the claim for assistance, including
change in or termination of assistance.
86. HANooK pt. IV, 6400(c). In an effort to assist the states in complying with the
written aspect of the notice requirement, H.E.W. publishes informational brochures
describing the right to a fair hearing to be distributed to applicants.
87. Id. (emphasis added).
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(2) there must be notice of the right to an attorney, and the means avail-
able, if any, to secure one; and (3) there must be a clear explanation of
these rights to the claimant so that he fully understands them. For the
state regulations to comply with the federal rules they must incorporate
all three of these elements.
Only nine of the state regulations fully comply with the notice
provisions of the Handbook.8 (See Fig. 2 supra.) Although most of
the states make some provision regarding notice to the claimant of his
right to a fair hearing, this generally takes the form of a simple notice
that he shall be informed of his right to a hearing at the time of applica-
tion and/or subsequent decision.8 9 Furthermore, seven states have no
notice provision at all in their regulations 0 This omission, though it
represents only a minority of the states, is a serious indictment of the
hearing process in those jurisdictions, and reinforces the view that,
in many cases, the applicant is never apprised of this right in any way.91
The single most significant omission of those state regulations which
do have some provision is the failure to provide for notice to the client
of his right to be represented by legal counsel throughout the hearing
process. Of the states which do provide that notice of this right must
be afforded the claimant, only a handful go so far as to indicate that
the claimant should be referred to a local legal aid office if he is unable
to afford the services of an attorney."2 None of the states has provided
88. Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Montana, Ohio, Pennsylvania
and West Virginia. See Appendix infra.
89. E.g., ALABAMA PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL pt. 1, § II (1968):
At the time of application and the time of any [subsequent] agency action
affecting an applicant's or recipients claim to assistance, give him a written
statement of the right to a hearing and the method by which a hearing may
be obtained.
90. Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Oklahoma. See Ap-
pendix infra.
91. Welfare Caseworker Interview. See also Briar, Welfare from Below: The Re-
cipients Views of the Public Welfare System, LAW oF THE PooR, 46, 47 (1966),
reporting the published results of a study in which 60% of the recipients interviewed
reported that they were not informed about the right to appeal.
92. Only eleven states provide for notice of the right to any attorney at time of
application and/or adverse agency action. See Appendix infra. Of these states only
New York, North Carolina, Delaware and Ohio go so far as to make provision for
referral to legal services. E.g., NEW YoRK PUBLIC AssisTANcE MANUAL § IV(B) (4)
(1968):
The social services official ... upon the request of the appellant for legal
counsel to assist him in the fair hearing shall refer the appellant to com-
munity legal services available for such purposes.
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a complete legal services program for which federal financial participa-
tion is available, and a number even discourage the participation of the
attorney in the hearing process0 3 Two-thirds of the states' regulations
make no provision for notice of the right to an attorney at the initial
stage in the proceeding, and the fact that some do provide such notice
just prior to the hearing does not cure this defect. This demonstrates one
of the central failings of the hearing process as it is presently constituted
in the states-representation by counsel is neither encouraged nor ap-
preciated by most of the state and local agencies 4 The few who have
recognized the significance of the attorney in the hearing process only
serve to emphasize the inadequacies of the remainder. The significance
of this fact, in light of new regulations requiring legal representation at
fair hearings, will be more fully explored later (see sub-section V, infra).
The second omission found in a significant number of states is the
failure to provide for a full and complete explanation of the right to a
hearing. (See Fig 2, supra.) This requirement is not less significant than
the one regarding notice of the right to an attorney. It is doubtful that
the average caseworker, overburdened as he is, will take the time to
fully explain these rights unless the state regulations specifically direct
him to do so. If the emphasis on such procedure is absent at the state
level, there is small hope of finding it in practice at the local level.9 5
Again the federal requirement is clear and permits no varying inter-
pretation, and yet, forty-four percent of the states' regulations lack
provisions requiring the local agency to provide a detailed explanation
of the hearing rights.
In sum, the notice requirement of the federal rules, although among
the most basic and crucial to the hearing process, has received only
partial compliance by a majority of the states. This failure cannot be
cured by elaborate provisions governing the applicant's rights during
the hearing. As he is generally unaware that he possesses any rights at
93. E.g., MINESOTA PUBLIC WELFARE MANuAL § VIII-6422 (1964) which states that
the hearing process should be free from rules of procedure because otherwise "it might
. . compel some petitioners to seek legal counsel. . . '
OKLAHomr D, ARTmNT OF PuBLic WFARE M wuAL § 546.71 (1968): "Legal counsel
is unnecessary, but the privilege of counsel is not denied when it is desired by the
client."
94. See sub-section V infra and notes following.
95. In an effort to secure compliance by the State of New York with this aspect of
the notice provision of the federal regulations, a suit was instituted on behalf of welfare
recipients to enjoin the New York agency from implementing the state's fair hearing
procedures on the grounds that on their face they violated the federal regulations.
Royal v. Wyman, Civil No. 3237 (S.D.N.Y, filed Aug. 6, 1968).
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all, it is necessary that the claimant be fully informed of his right to a
fair hearing, if the process is to remain effective.
E. The Request Clause-What Constitutes a Hearing Request?
The federal regulations provide that a request for a hearing by a
claimant is considered as
any clear expression (oral or written) by the claimant (or per-
son acting for him, such as his legal representative, relative or
friend) to the effect that he wants an opportunity to present his
case to higher authority. The freedom to make such a request is
not limited or interfered with in any way, and agency emphasis
will be in helping the claimant in submitting and processing his
request, and in preparing his case, if needed.96
The clear emphasis of the federal requirement is that the claimant need
not make his request in any specific manner or employ any specific
form. Any indication of a desire to appeal should be sufficient to in-
stitute the hearing process, and no barriers can be placed in the claimants
way which would serve as a possible impediment to the institution of
an appeal.9 7
FIGURE 3-REQUEST CLAUSE
Some
States Provision No Provision Violates Unde-
Which But at All or termined
Comply Insufficient Restricts
Number of
States 24 5 5 13 3
Percentage 48% 10% 10% 26% 6%
Less than a majority of the state regulations have provisions which
substantially comply with the federal request clause.98 A small number
of states make some provision identifying what constitutes an accept-
able request which fails to sufficiently specify the liberal and unre-
stricted nature of the federal rule,99 and an equal number make no
provisions for requests at all. 10 0 More serious is the large number of
96. HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6300(b).
97. Id.
98. See Figure III supra. For a list of each state's provisions, see Appendix infra.
99. E.g., MARYLAND PUBLIC ASSISrANcE M.A.uA. § 225.3 (1966): "An appeal for a fair
hearing is made by the use of Form # 334, provided for the purpose and addressed
to the State Department of Public Welfare." For a list of states with incomplete pro-
visions, see Appendix infra.
100. Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa and Massachusetts. See Appendix infra.
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state regulations which impose restrictions on the freedom of the
claimant to request a fair hearing. Most of these restrictions are based
on a requirement that a request by the claimant must be made in writ-
ing.10' For example, the Louisiana regulations provide that when a
client desires to request a fair hearing he shall be provided with an
appropriate form and "advised to submit it to the Commissioner." 102
By not recognizing an appeal request until such time as it has been
reduced to a written statement, the agency places a serious impediment
in the way of the appellant which constitutes a direct violation of the
federal regulations. Other states have provisions not so clearly violative
of the federal rules, but which none the less create additional barriers
for the claimant who desires to request an appeal. The Minnesota regu-
lations, for example, provide that prior to the claimant requesting a
fair hearing before the state welfare board the decision must be sub-
jected to a rehearing by the county agency. 10 This and similar pro-
cedures would seem to be in violation of the federal requirement that
"the freedom to make . . . a request is not limited or interfered with
in any way."
F. Reasonable Time to Appeal.
The Handbook provides that in the state hearing regulations "pro-
vision (must be) made for reasonable time in which to appeal agency
action." 104 What constitutes a reasonable time is not explained in the
federal rules, and arguably, the states have considerable latitude in the
time limits for an appeal. The state regulations exhibit a wide range of
time limits allowable to claimants to institute an appeal. Thirty states
have complied with the federal requirements, at least in so far as they
have made some provision for a time limit of appeal.105 The majority
of these states allow thirty,06 sixty,'0 7 or ninety days.'0 8 Because the
101. Those states that require or imply the necessity of written requests are Alabama,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Virginia. See Appendix infra.
102. LOuISIANA PUBLIC WLFAmRE MANuAL pt. XV, § 2-1501 (1968).
103. MrNNESOrA PUBLIC WFARE MANUAL pt. VIII, §§ 6433-34 (1964).
104. HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6300(d) (emphasis added).
105. For a list of states with some provision for a time limit on appeals, see Appendix
infra.
106. E.g., Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, South
Dakota and Virginia.
107. E.g., Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, New Mexico, New York and
South Carolina.
108. E.g., Colorado, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and
Texas.
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federal requirements have placed no interpretation on "reasonable time"
none of these provisions can be considered unreasonable per se, although
a time limit of at least sixty days would seem desirable.0 9 Of the remain-
ing states with some provision, only Tennessee which allows a ten day
time period plus eight days advance notice would seem to be clearly
unreasonable."' The remaining twenty states have enacted no provision
at all governing the time for appeal and presumably would be governed
by independent standards of "reasonableness." In the final analysis, there
seems to be substantial compliance with the federal provision; most
states, either specifically or by implication, implement the federal
standard.
G. Complaint and Adjustment Procedure-The Advance Notice
Provision.
The federal hearing regulations emphasize the necessity of imple-
mentation by the states of detailed complaint and adjustment pro-
cedures by which the claimant can seek a review of his situation at the
county or local level short of a formal appeal to the state agency."'
The regulations, specify that these adjustment procedures, "whereby
corrective action may be easily requested and readily taken without
the need of a hearing, are necessary." 112
As a necessary adjunct to the adjustment procedures, recent federal
regulations have added the requirement that "the recipient is to be
109. This is based on the fact that the claimant should be afforded sufficient time to
consult with an attorney or other advisor in order to determine the appropriate course
of action.
110. TENNESSEE PUBLIC WELFARE MANUA, vol. II, ch. VIII, Fair Hearings, Time Limit
for Filing an Appeal (1968).
111. HANDBOOK Pt. IV, 6400(a). The regulation provides that:
Effective complaint and adjustment procedures, whereby corrective action
may be easily requested and readily taken without the need for a hearing, are
necessary, when indicated. Advance opportunity afforded the recipient to
respond to questions which could result in change of grant or termination
is a significant part of such procedures. So is written, and whenever prac-
tical, oral information of the reasons for change, denial, or termination.
This is particularly important where the agency decision is based on judg-
mental factors or eligibility requirements that entail evaluative decisions
on the part of workers, as compared to decisions based on nondebatable
facts (such as receipt OASI, death, etc.). However, the State and local
agency adjustment procedures cannot be allowed to interfere with the
hearing process.
112. Id.
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given advance notice of questions the agency has about his eligibility" "I
so that he has an opportunity to discuss his situation before receiving
formal notice of reduction in payments or termination of assistance.
The advance notice requirements are part of a general recognition by
the federal agency that where questions of eligibility requirements or
factors requiring evaluative decisions by workers are involved, there
should be an opportunity for advance review of those decisions, with
the participation of the claimant, prior to any final action which affects
his receipt of assistance. This is merely a reflection of the fact that
welfare recipients are often completely dependent on welfare payments
for their subsistence, and agency action taken prior to review often
works an undue hardship on the claimant. (As part of this policy,
H.E.W. has also issued new regulations providing for the continuation
of payments pending the fair hearing. This is discussed in sub-section
Q infra.)
FIGURa 4-ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURE AND ADVANCE NOTICE
States
Which Insufficient No Restric- Unde-
Comply Provision Provision tive termined
Established Corn- No. 25 9 12 0 4
plaint and Adjust-
ment Procedures % 50% 18% 24% 0 8%
Advance Notice No. 4 0 42 0 4
Clause
% 8% 0 84% 0 8%
Twenty-five state regulations establish substantial and effective
complaint procedures whereby informal adjustment of disputes can be
pursued short of a formal appeal (see Fig. 4 supra). In general these
states have established a designated official within each county or local
office who must be available to handle complaints regarding decisions
and actions of social workers, and to insure that a request for recon-
113. HANDBOOK pt. IV, 2300(d) (5) (emphasis added). In conjunction with the new
regulation providing for advance notice to recipients, H.E.W. has issued new provisions
permitting federal participation up to 30 days following notice to the recipient by the
agency that his eligibility is in question. This additional period of time is designed to
give the recipient an opportunity to present additonal information or request a hearing.
Handbook Transmittal No. 147 (Sept. 30, 1968).
19691
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
sideration and corrective action will be handled promptly." 4 Although
procedures vary considerably, they all clearly recognize the priority
given to effective action by the localities on complaints by recipients.
Other states have failed to adequately comply with the federal provision
by not emphasizing the significance of a prompt and thorough review
of all decisions which are called into question by recipients or appli-
cants." 5 There are unfortunately, a number of states which have failed
to institute any complaint or adjustment procedure short of a formal
appeal. 116
Of even greater significance than an established outlet for com-
plaints, in terms of an effective fair hearing process, are the advance
notice requirements of the federal regulations. Because these regula-
tions have been in effect for only one year, it is not surprising that only
four states-New York, Tennessee, Mississippi, and California-have
complied with the provision by enacting advance notice procedures." 7
The New York regulations are detailed and complete, and should serve
as a model for the states who have yet to comply. The New York
Manual provides that when a social services official proposes to discon-
tinue or suspend a grant of public assistance he must notify the recipi-
ent of his intention in writing at least seven days prior to the date of
the proposed action." 8 The notice must advise the recipient that, if
he so requests, he can have his case reviewed before the county super-
visor, and will at that time be afforded an opportunity to present both
written and oral evidence in defense of his position and to have the
assistance of an attorney or other representative. The county super-
114. E.g., DELAwARE PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL S 5510(1) (1968). Other state adjust-
ment and complaint procedures provide for the reception of complaints at the state
office by establishing a central complaint unit whose function is to initiate review of
the decision at the local level, and to insure action on the complaint by requiring a
written report from the local office indicating the action taken on the complaint. See,
RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE SERvIcE MANUAL, ch. IV, § II(B) (1969). See also
Appendix infra.
115. For an example of an insufficient adjustment procedure, see ARIzoNA PUBLIc
WELFARE MANUAL §§ 3-1207 to 3-1207.1 (1965). For a list of states with insufficient pro-
visions, see Appendix infra.
116. Those states with no provision at all are Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecti-
cut, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Tennessee, and Virginia.
See Appendix infra.
117. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE MANUAL, PSS Reg. 44-325.43 (1968);
Missssippi MANUAL OF PUBLIC WELFARE Vol. III, § F-6100 to 6103 (1968); NEw YoRK
Puauc ASSISTANCE MANUAL § E(2) (b) (1968); TENNESSEE PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL
vol. II, ch. VIII (1968).
118. §E(2)(b) (1968).
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visor then makes a decision based on the review, but no termination or
suspension can be made until he renders that decision. Should he decide
adversely to the recipient, written notice, and a clear statement that the
fair hearing procedure is available, is sent to the claimant.119
The advance notification clause, together with the new proposed
"prior hearing" regulations (see sub-section Q infra), go far towards
fulfilling the basic due process requirement, implicit in the fair hearing
procedure, that no detrimental agency action will be taken until an
opportunity for administrative review at all levels has been afforded
the aggrieved party.
H. Publication and Distribution of Hearing Procedures.
One of the most significant aspects of the fair hearing process is the
necessity that all participants, particulary the aggrieved party, be fully
familiar with the procedures to be followed at the hearing. The federal
regulations require that in the participating states "[h] earing procedures
will be issued and publicized by the State agency for the guidance of
all concerned." 120 In order to satisfactorily comply with this require-
ment the federal rules provide that the states must issue "hearing pro-
cedures... in the form of rules and regulations or in some other form
in which they will be publicized." 121
FIGURE 5-PUBLICATION OF HEARING PROCEDURES
States Restricts
Which Insufficient No Provision or Unde-
Comply Provisions at All Violates termined
Number of
States 13 3 31 0 3
Percentage 26% 6% 62% 0 6%
119. Id. Only the local administrator is competent to undertake the review.
120. HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6200(e).
121. Id. 6300(i). In giving guidance to the states with regard to compliance with
this provision, the HANDBOOK states that:
The publication of hearing procedures in the form of rules and regulations
or in a clearly stated pamphlet helps to emphasize the importance of the
procedure. The material is useful to applicants and recipients or to others
interested in their behalf. It contributes to the fairness of the hearing pro-
cedure, and emphasizes that there is "due process" in program administration
affecting the right to public assistance.
Id. 6400(b).
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The clear intent of these provisions is that the states should establish
detailed rules of procedure governing the conduct of the hearing, and
then publish these rules to enable all interested parties and their repre-
sentatives to become familiar with the established procedure well in
advance of the hearing itself.
An analysis of the state hearing regulations indicate that fewer than
one-third of the states have promulgated and issued hearing procedures
which fully comply with federal requirements,122 and only a hand-
ful of others have any such rules at all.123  Of the states which
have complied with the federal rules, a few have established detailed
and exhaustive procedures sufficient to serve as points of refer-
ence during, and prior to, the conduct of the hearing. An ex-
ample of this kind of procedure is found in the Wyoming regulations
which provide established policy governing pre-hearing procedures,
motions, continuances, stipulations, default, order of proceedings during
the hearing, authority of the hearing officer, introduction of evidence,
witnesses, subpoenas, depositions, exhibits and findings of fact, and
conclusions of law.124 The effect of this detailed procedure is to trans-
form the hearing from an informal "review" into a formal "adjudica-
tion" of the recipient's rights. Formal procedures have been criticized
on the grounds that they do not materially aid the welfare recipient.125
The reaction of those who have participated in welfare hearings in
states which have failed to issue formal rules of procedure, tends to
refute this criticism. 126 One of the central problems confronting attorneys
representing welfare recipients is the lack of rules of procedure to
govern the proceedings. 27 Because of this omission, neither the claimant
nor his representative has any way of knowing such fundamental ques-
tions as who has the burden of proof, and the burden of going forward
with the evidence, and what evidence is relevant and what is not.'2
The proceeding, in the absence of established rules, has been character-
122. See Appendix infra.
123. Arkansas, Delaware and Indiana have established a basic outline of procedure
but their outlines are incomplete or insufficiently publicized to be of any use to claimants
or their representatives. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL § 6340
(1968); DELAWARE PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL S 5830 (1967); INDIANA PUBLIC AssIsTANcE
MANUAL ch. XIII-1, § II(b) (1963).
124. WYOMING PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL Vol. I, §§ 554.4 to 556 (1968).
125. Handler, supra note 45, at 170.
126. See Appendix infra.
127. Interview with George Stewart, Attorney, Legal Aid Clinic, Ann Arbor, Michi-
gan, Feb. 10, 1969.
128. Id.
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ized as "incredibly informal to the point where the whole process is
chaos.. .. Everyone talks at once, facts and opinions get mixed up,
everyone talks from hearsay, makes judgments, etc.... It is impossible
to understand how, from all that confusion,... a record can be produced
on which the hearing officer can base his decision." 129
It is only too clear from this evidence that without published rules
of procedure, an informal hearing can result in substantial con-
fusion. The fact that informality may place less pressure on the unrep-
resented claimant does not excuse the states' failure to comply with the
requirements of the federal department which has reached a different
conclusion. In an attempt to remedy this omission, class mandamus
actions have already been brought in several jurisdictions to require
the state Department of Social Welfare to publish well defined hearing
procedures. 13° Although these suits have yet to be resolved, they serve
to point out the growing awareness of the significance of established
procedure in the hearing process.
1. The Prior Examination of Documents.
A fundamental principle of the administrative fair hearing is that the
aggrieved individual should have the right to be informed of the nature
and content of the documents to be introduced in support of the de-
cision from which he is appealing. In recognizing this principle the
federal regulations require the states to insure that "[t] he claimant or
his representative have adequate opportunity to examine material that
will be introduced as evidence prior to the hearing as well as during
the hearing. ,, . 3' The purpose of this requirement is clear-to make
available to the claimant in a welfare hearing the same kind of "dis-
covery" procedures available to parties in a civil suit. Unfortunately, the
lack of interpretive provisions explaining the nature of the requirement
has led to questions concerning the extent of this right at the state
level.
The central failing of the state hearing regulations with respect to
prior examination is the absence of any provision affording the claimant
the right to inspect official documents that will be introduced in evi-
129. Id.
130. E.g., Royal v. Wyman, Civil No. 3237 (S.D.N.Y, filed Aug. 6, 1968); Soto v.
Wyman, Civil No. M-5213 (App. Div. N.Y., appeal dismissed Sept. 24, 1968).
131. HANDBOOK pt. IV 6300(n) (emphasis added).
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FIGURE 6-PRIOR EXAMINATION OF DOCUMENTS
States
Which Insufficient No Provision Arguably Unde-
Comply Provision at All Restrictive termined
Number of
States 10 8 25 4 3
Percentage 20% 16% 50% 8% 6%
dence by the local office.1 2 (See Fig. 6 supra.) Although it is impossible
to determine the nature of the policy followed in those jurisdictions in
the absence of state regulation, evidence indicates that the general
practice is to prohibit the claimant from having access to the case
record, and other documents, which are either directly introduced into
evidence or form the basis of materials later introduced.'8 ' All the
states follow the practice of requiring the local or county office to
prepare a report or summary of the facts which is sent to the hearing
officer prior to the decision, and generally introduced into the record.
In those jurisdictions where there is no prior examination requirement,
presumably the claimant is unable to examine this report."4
In addition to the states with no provision, a number restrict the
right of prior examination by specific regulation. This usually takes
the form of a provision denying the claimant access to the case record
and related materials. Whether this constitutes a violation of the federal
requirements is not clear, since these states also provide that the case
record is not to be introduced into evidence at the hearing.135 If not
a technical violation, these practices amount to a violation of the spirit
of the federal regulations because, in practice, the state agency, though
abstaining from formally introducing the case record in the hearing,
132. For a list of states which make no provision for prior examination of evidence,
see Appendix infra.
133. Interview, supra note 127.
"One big problem with the hearing process in Michigan is that the Depart-
ment will not allow attorneys to see the client's file before the hearing. We
have little or no response or co-operation from the state even with regard to
the federal requirements of free access. Once we get a case we send the
State department a letter requesting to see the records and citing the federal
regulations on behalf of our claim. The response is always negative. They
take the position that the case records are confidential, and continue to hold
that position in spite of what I regard as the clear commands of the federal
manual."
134. Id.
135. E.g., ALABAMA PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL pt. I, S II(I) (B) (4) (1968).
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relies instead on the testimony of a caseworker who often reads from
a record which is not introduced, and hence unavailable to the recipi-
ent.13' Although mandamus actions have been filed asserting that this
practice violates the federal regulations,137 H.E.W. has yet to issue
further interpretations of this provision.
There are, however, at least ten states which have provisions that
appear to be in substantial compliance with federal law. 138 Generally,
these provisions simply reiterate the federal requirements without any
further interpretation.1 9 However, a few states have provisions suf-
ficiently explicit to cover the case record problem. For example, the
Massachusetts manual provides that "[t]he appellant or his repre-
sentative must be afforded the right to see that part of any 'written
material-budget, worksheet, medical data or the Appeal Case Sum-
mary Forms-based on the issues involved .. ." 10 In order for the
prior hearing requirements to serve as an effective means of affording
the claimant an adequate opportunity to prepare his case, the state
provisions should at least equal this standard.
J. The Prohibition of Non-Record Information.
Related to the previous provision concerning prior examination of
documents, but designed to reach a different problem, is the federal
regulation governing non-record communication between the local
agency and the hearing authority. The regulations provide that:
Non-record or confidential information which the claimant
does not have an opportunity to hear or see is not made a part
of the hearing record or used in a decision on the appeal. The
hearing officer does not review the case records or other ma-
136. The Right to a Fair Hearing: Improvements and Problems, 13 WELFARE L.
BuLL. 10, 11 (1968).
137. Napper v. Wyman, Civil No. 65035/68 (Sup. Ct. N.Y, dismissed April 22, 1968);
Rodreguez v. Wyman, Civil No. 20997 (App. Div. N.Y. April 5, 1968); Pagan v.
Wyman, Civil No. 05704 (App. Div. N.Y., filed April 5, 1968); Soto v. Wyman Civil
No. 5731 (App. Div. N.Y, dismissed April 22, 1968); Reeves v. Wyman, Civil No. 20997
(App. Div. N.Y., filed Dec. 29, 1967).
138. Appendix infra.
139. CONNECTICUT PUBLIC AssIsrA~cE MANUAL VOl. I, 6300(15) (1968); HAWAII PUBLIC
WELFARE MANUAL S 2503 (3)(d) (1968).
140. MASSACHUSETtS PUBLIC ASSISTANCE POLICY MANUAL ch. VI, § C(1) (b) (1968)
(emphasis added).
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terial prior to the hearing unless such material is made available
to the claimant or his representative.141
The clear intent of this provision is to prevent evidence, which the
claimant does not have an opportunity to rebut, from being used,
either directly or indirectly, in the decision-making process. It is
specifically designed to prevent the practice, prevalent in some jurisdic-
tions, of having the local or county office send a report of the "facts" of
the case to the hearing officer prior to the hearing. The regulation does
not prevent such reports per se, but it does require that they also be made
available to the claimant.
FIGURE 7-NON-RECORD INFORMATION
States Violates
Which Insufficient No Provision or Unde-
Comply Provision at All Restricts termined
Number of
States 16 3 22 5 4
Percentage 32% 6% 44% 10% 8%
Examination of the state hearing regulations reveals that only one-
third of the states have provisions regarding non-record or confidential
information which comply with the federal requirements. 42 In general,
these provisions are relatively uncomplicated, simply requiring that "any
material, including the case record, which is reviewed by the Hearing
Officer prior to the hearing is also made available to the appellant or his
representative." 143
In spite of the fact that compliance with this provision requires merely
a simple policy determination, twenty-two states 44 have no provision
prohibiting secret reports, and five states 45 go so far as to explicitly or
implicitly accept them. An example of the latter type of provision can be
found in the Michigan Manual which provides that "[a] fter study of the
county bureau's report, if the referee finds that additional information
141. HANDBOOK pt. IV., 6300(o). This provision is relatively new, having been added
for the first time Feb. 8, 1968.
142. For a list of complying states, see Appendix infra.
143. COLORADo PUBLIC AsSISTANCE MANUAL § 4724.012 (1968). See also RHODE IsLAND
PUBLIC AsSISTANCE SERVICE MANUAL ch. IV, § VI(c) (1969. ". .. [T]he Hearing officer
will not review any information that is not made available to the applicant or recipient
or his representative (s)."
144. See Appendix infra for a list of states with no provision.
145. Id.
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is necessary, he will arrange to review the case record at the bureau in
advance of the hearing." "" This provision, combined with the fact that
in Michigan the claimant or his representative is not permitted access to
the case record, 147 seems a clear violation of the federal provision
and represents the type of practice which the federal rules are designed
to prevent.
K. The Convenience of Claimant Clause.
The welfare recipient typically has limited means available to meet
any expense incurred in attending the hearing. Furthermore, if disabled
or aged, his mobility may be severely restricted. In order to prevent this
fact from interfering with the free exercise of his hearing rights, the
Handbook requires that "[t] he hearing will be conducted at a time, date
and place convenient to the claimant, and adequate preliminary written
notice will be given." 148 This requirement is not satisfied simply by
attempting to schedule the hearing at a time and place amenable to the
recipient. The regulations insure that the state agency recognize that "it
has not discharged its responsibility for a hearing unless it has taken all
steps necessary to enable a claimant who requested a hearing to attend
the hearing in person or to be represented by a person of his own
choosing." 149 If the hearing is to be held at any distance from the
claimant's residence, the states are under an obligation "to provide for
the transportation and other costs of the claimant, his representative, and
his witnesses." iI0
The thrust of these requirements is that no hearing shall be delayed
or canceled because the claimant is not able to incur the financial expense
necessary to attend. It is part of the total design of the federal rules, to
make the hearing process fully accessible to all.
146. MICHIGAN MANUmAL OF SOCIAL SERVICES pt. H, § 386 (1949).
147. Interview, supra notes 127, 133.
148. HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6200(g). This requirement is further emphasized in 6300(1)
which provides:
The convenience of the claimant is considered in setting the date, time,
and place for the hearing. Notice is given in writing with adequate pre-
liminary information about the hearing procedure necessary for his prepara-
tion for the hearing and effective presentation of his case. He is advised as
to the use of witnesses and legal counsel or other representative, as well as
any procedure or financial provisions for obtaining legal representation, in-
cluding availability of fees for legal counsel from the agency.
149. Id. 6400 (d).
150. Id.
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FiGu S-CONVENIENCE CLAUSE
States Violates
Which Insufficient No Provision or Unde-
Comply Provision at All Restricts termined
Number of
States 31 7 9 0 3
Percentage 62% 14% 18% 0 6%
Almost two-thirds of the states have provisions which require that
the convenience of the claimant be considered in setting the date, time,
and place of the hearing, and, if necessary, holding the hearing in the
claimant's home.'5' A number of states make some provision for con-
sideration of the claimant's needs in scheduling the hearing, but fail to
fully comply with the federal regulations in one or more significant
respects. In most of these jurisdictions, the main difficulty is a failure to
provide for transportation expenses for the claimant, his representative,
and witnesses.15 2
There are a few states which have enacted no regulations pro-
viding for the convenience of the appellant in scheduling and con-
ducting the hearing.163 Although, in the absence of any regulation, the
actual practice in these jurisdictions remains unascertained, in at least
one of these states a mandamus action has been filed against the state
agency by recipients who contend that they are prejudiced by the failure
of the hearing regulations to provide for advance reimbursement for
transportation expenses, or that the hearing be held in a convenient
location.154
The convenience clause is perhaps not the most crucial clause to an
effective fair hearing process; nevertheless, compliance is a significant
aspect of the state's attitude toward its fair hearing procedure. It is a basis
for some optimism, therefore, that compliance, though far from unani-
mous, at least encompasses a large majority of the participating states.
L. Independent Medical Assessment Requirement.
Not infrequently it is necessary to resolve the issue of the claimant's
151. E.g., RHODE ISLAND PuBLic ASSISTANCE SERVICE MANUAL ch. III, § V(1) (1969).
For a list of complying states, see Appendix infra.
152. E.g., NORTH DAKOTA SOCIAL WORK MANUAL ch. 361, § 4, par. 3 (1952). For a list
of states with insufficient provisions, see Appendix infra.
153. See Appendix infra.
154. Royal v. Wyman, Civil No. 3237 (S.D. N.Y., filed Aug. 6, 1968).
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medical or physical status. Previous practice allowed the state agency's
medical personnel to render all these judgments which, because of
financial inability, the claimant was unable to refute. The federal agency,
eventually realizing the injustice of this procedure, promulgated a new
regulation providing that:
When the hearing involves medical issues, a medical assesse-
ment other than that of the person or persons involved in making
the original decision will be obtained and made a part of the
record if the hearing officer or the appellant considers it neces-
Sary. 155
The regulations require that if such an independent medical assessment is
requested by the claimant it is to be obtained, at the expense of the state
agency, from a medical source considered satisfactory by the claimant. 156
Though perhaps not crucial to the hearing process because of its limited
application, the medical assessment provision is yet another example of
the emphasis of the federal rules -upon insuring that no claimant is to be
denied a fair hearing simply because he lacks the necessary means to
provide an adequate presentation of his case.
FIGuRE 9-INDEPENDENT MEDICAL ASSESSMENT
States Violates
Which Insufficient No Provision or Unde-
Comply Provision at All Restricts termined
Number of
States 23 1 22 0 4
Percentage 46% 2% 44% 0 8%
In view of the fact that this regulation has been effective for only
a short time, it is perhaps understandable that about half of the states
have failed to implement the requirement.15 This does raise the ques-
155. HA.NBOOK pt. IV, 6200(h) (emphasis added). This regulation was incorporated
in the 1968 revisions in Feb. 8, 1968.
156. Id. 6300 (m).
The hearing officer can also consider the physician's report in the record
or can request additional evidence. The assessment of such medical authori-
ties will be reported in writing or by personal testimony as an expert witness
for the hearing record.
157. For a list of states with no provision for an independent medical assessment, see
Appendix infra.
3551
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tion, however, of the serious time lapse between the promulgation of
new regulations by the federal agency and their eventual implementa-
tion by the states.
There has been affirmative action, however, by twenty-three of the
participating states,'158 whose provisions generally follow the federal
requirements closely. The question still remains as to the efficacy of
the medical assessment provision in view of the fact that the federal
rules do not require that notice of this right be given claimants. In the
absence of some form of notification, the existence of a regulation
which relies on the specific request of the appellant before it is opera-
tive is of dubious benefit to the aggrieved individual who is often
unaware of his right to make such a demand. It is clear that future
federal regulations must provide for notification to the claimant that
an independent medical assessment can be secured, and the expense
borne by the state agency.
M. Withdrawal and Abandonment of Hearing Requests.
If the state agency has established effective informal complaint and
adjustment procedures a satisfactory resolution of the dispute may
occur short of the formal hearing. If the necessary safeguards are
observed, this can be a desirable aspect of the hearing process, saving
time and effort on both sides. The federal rules recognize, however, that
unless provisions in the regulations clearly establish the proper agency
action, undue pressures may be brought on the claimant to agree to
an adjustment even though unfavorable in his position, and to with-
draw his request for a hearing.'59 To protect the claimant's rights in
this regard the Handbook provides that "[t] he agency does not deny
or dismiss a request for a hearing except where it has been withdrawn
by the claimant in writing or abandoned." "0 To insure that the states
are fully aware of the underlying reason for the withdrawal pro-
158. The majority of these states have enacted provisions similar to that found in
the RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE SERVICE MANUAL ch. IV, § VI(E) (1969):
When the hearing involves medical issues and the Hearing Officer and/or
the applicant or recipient considers it necessary, a medical assessment other
than that of the person or persons involved in the original decision will be
obtained, will be made part of the hearing record and will, if requested by
the applicant or recipient be obtained at agency expense. (emphasis added).
For a list of states with provisions substantially complying with the HANDBOOK, see
Appendix infra.
159. HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6400(a). "[T] he State and local agency adjustment procedures
,cannot be allowed to interfere with the hearing process."
160. Id. 6300().
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vision, the regulations emphasize that, since every aggrieved claimant is
entitled to a full opportunity for a fair hearing, only he can withdraw
his request, and such withdrawal must be in writing.161
The abandonment provisions of the federal requirements are de-
signed to meet a different problem, specifically, where the claimant
fails to appear at the scheduled time and place of the hearing. To insure
that the claimant's opportunity for a hearing is not denied simply
through oversight or unavoidable circumstance, the regulations provide
that a request is considered abandoned
only if neither the claimant nor his representative appears
at the time and place agreed upon for the hearing and if 'within
a reasonable time after the mailing of an inquiry as to 'whether he
wishes any further action on his request for a hearing, no reply is
received by either the local or state agency.162
The requirements of the latter part of this regulation are twofold:
1) the agency must give the claimant a reasonable time, following failure
to appear, to indicate a desire to continue; and 2) the initiative in this
regard must remain with the state agency and not the claimant. To-
gether these two provisions serve to implement the fundamental
federal policy that the fair hearing procedures are to "assure the right
of every claimant to demand and obtain a fair hearing [which right] is
not to be limited or interfered with in any way." 163
Only a few of the participating states have no provision regarding
withdrawal or abandonment of hearing requests,' and nearly two-
thirds have regulations which substantially comply with the federal
FiGuRE 10-WITHDRAWAL AND ABANDONMENT PROCEDURES
States Violates
Which Insufficient No Provision or Unde-
Comply Provision at All Restricts termined
Number of
States 33 4 5 4 4
Percentage 66% 8% 10% 8% 8%
161. Id. 6400(a).
162. Id. 6300(f) (emphasis added).
163. Id. 6400 (a).
164. California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho and Montana have no provision for with-
drawal or abandonment. See Appendix infra.
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requirements. 165 (See Fig. 10 supra.) However, a significant percentage
of the state regulations are either insufficient, and do not fully comply
with the federal rules, or have express provisions which violate or
restrict the application of the rights granted to claimants under federal
policy. Of those states with insufficient provisions,0 6 the most common
omissions are either a failure to require that a withdrawal must be in
writing to be effective, or to provide for an inquiry following the
claimant's failure to appear at the scheduled time for the hearing.""'
More serious, of course, are the provisions of those states which directly
violate the federal requirements.16 For example, the Florida regulations
provide that if the claimant makes known his "desire to withdraw" but
does not reduce this to a written request, "the Hearing Officer will
write a letter to the client explaining that unless the agency is informed
to the contrary within a given time, it will be assumed that the request
is withdrawn." 169 By themselves, these and similar provisions may not
seem a serious violation of federal requirements, but, in fact, they per-
mit the kind of local agency pressure that the federal regulations are
specifically designed to prohibit.
N. The Conduct of the Hearing-Due Process and the Rights of
Claimants.
Equally as important as those provisions which provide for the protec-
tion and preservation of the claimant's rights prior to the hearing, are the
provisions governing the procedure to be employed during the conduct
of the hearing itself. In addition to insuring that the claimant's op-
portunity to employ the hearing process is not impaired in any way, the
federal regulations are also designed to provide for a full and im-
partial review of the case at the hearing. In an attempt to implement this
165. An example of complete and detailed withdrawal and abandonment regulations
can be found in the ALABAMA PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL pt. I, §§ II, I(B)4, I(C) (1968)
providing for written withdrawal, stating the reasons therefore based on the claimant's
own decision, and a 20 day period after the making of an inquiry before an appeal is
considered abandoned.
For a list of states whose provisions comply with the HANDBooK, see Appendix ifWra.
166. See Appendix infra.
167. E.g., as to the first omission: ILLINOIS CATEGORICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL Rule
1.08 (1963).
168. See Appendix infra.
169. FLORIDA MANUAL OF PUBLIC WELFARE ch. 100, § V (1967). For an example of
a restrictive abandonment procedure, see ARIZONA PUBLIC WELFAE MANUAL § 3-1207.2 (E)
(1967) which provides that "[i]f the applicant does not appear for the hearing and
cannot show good cause for being absent the appeal shall be dismissed."
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policy, the regulations provide that during the conduct of the hearing
the claimant or his representative will have the opportunity.
1) to examine all documents and records used at the hearing;
2) at his option, to present his case himself or with the aid of
others including legal counsel;
3) to bring witnesses;
4) to establish all pertinent facts and circumstances;
5) to advance any arguments without undue interference; and
6) to question or refute any testimony or evidence.170
That these specific requirements are intended to be inclusive is demon-
strated by the fact that, although the hearing is conducted in an in-
formal court-type procedure, it is nonetheless "subject to the require-
ments of due process." 171
Besides requiring that the claimant be afforded such standard pro-
cedural due process rights as the right to confrontation and cross-
examination,1 72 the due process provision also seems to require the
state agency to establish procedures governing the admissability of
relevant evidence, prohibition of hearsay testimony, and the nature of
proof required by the claimant in order to prevail. 7 3 Whether or not
the due process requirement compels a state to enact specific substantive
provisions covering these issues, it at least would seem to require that
the state provide some well-defined procedures so that consistent rulings
on these questions can be made by the hearing officer. Admitting for
the moment that the interpretation of this provision is open to question,
and that states may differ in their interpretation of the specific enact-
ments required, it is clear that the federal regulations require the states
to recognize due process rights in welfare hearings.
170. HAmBooK pt. IV, 6200(i).
171. Id. 6400(a) (emphasis added). The HANDBOOK attempts to make clear that the
claimant must be provided considerable latitude in the presentation of his case. The
procedure provides:
The claimant's right to a hearing includes the privilege of presenting his
case in any way he desires. Some will wish to tell their story in their own
way, some will desire to have a relative or friend present the evidence for
them, and still others will want to be represented by legal counsel ....
Furthermore, the claimant may bring witnesses if he desires to help him
establish pertinent facts and to explain his circumstances.
172. See generally Note, Right to Counsel in Public Welfare Hearings, 48 BosroN UjL.
REv. 468, 476-86 (1968).
173. Interview, supra note 127.
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FIGURE 11-PROCEDURE DURING THE HEARING
States No Violates
Which Insufficient Provision or Unde-
Comply Provisions at All Restricts termined
Express Federal No. of
Procedural States 38 6 2 0 4
Provisions
% 76% 12% 4% 0 8%
No. of
"Due Process" States 7 0 40 0 3
Provision
% 14% 0 80% 0 6%
Since the express federal requirements concerning the rights of
claimants establish only a minimum standard for the states to follow,
it is not surprising that over three-fourths of the states have provisions
guaranteeing these basic rights at the hearing.174 A handful of states
have either no provision at all'7 5 or regulations which fail to specify one
or more of the federal minimum guarantees.' 76
However, when the focus turns to a question of extending the pro-
tection of the claimant beyond this minimum-the right to inspect docu-
ments, the right to counsel, the right to introduce as well as confront
witnesses, and the right to establish facts, advance arguments, and refute
testimony-the state regulations are seriously deficient. Only seven states
specifically recognize in their regulations that the hearings are subject
to the requirements of due process,'7 7 and an even smaller number have
seriously attempted to implement this requirement by enacting detailed
provisions governing the conduct of the hearing, and controlling the
discretionary authority of the hearing officer and the state agency. Of the
latter states the most outstanding example is Washington'78 which estab-
lishes in sufficient detail: the authority of the hearing officer to take
official notice of matters of law and material facts;'7 9 the right of the
174. For the most part, these provisions merely reiterate the federal requirements
without making any attempt to provide guide lines for the official conducting the
hearing. For a list of states which comply with the minimum requirement, see Appendix
infra.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Alaska, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Tennessee and Texas have
provisions which reiterate the phrase that the "hearing is subject to the requirements
of due process." See Appendix infra.
178. WASHINGTON PURLiC AssisTANcE MANuAL II, ch. 388-08-150 to -500 (1968).
179. Id. ch. 388-08-375.
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claimant to subpoena witnesses;8 0 the right of the claimant to take
depositions, and submit interrogatories;"' the presumptions of law that
are operable during the hearing;""2 the right of the claimant to agree
to stipulations and admissions of fact; 8 3 the right of the claimant to
submit documentary evidence in advance of the hearing;8 the right of
the claimant to produce expert or opinion testimony;8 5 and rules of
evidence designed to protect the rights of all parties. 8 6
These procedures serve to protect the rights of all claimants by
preventing arbitrary action on the part of the hearing authority,'"
and by insuring that standard and uniform policies will be followed in
each case as required by the standards of due process.
0. The Impartial Hearing Officer and Hearing Authority.
One of the fundamental requirements of due process in administrative
hearing procedure is that the hearing officer charged with conducting
the hearing must be impartial, and removed from the decision being
appealed.8 8 This requirement, though basic, is often difficult to achieve
in actual practice. In those states which cannot afford a full-
time staff of hearing officers whose sole function is to preside over
welfare appeals, the designated hearing officer is frequently quite
familiar with the questioned agency action prior to the institution of
an appeal. The federal regulations, recognizing the existence of this
potential conflict, have promulgated specific, mandatory regulations de-
signed to prevent it. The Handbook provides that "[t] he hearing will
be conducted by an impartial official (or officials) of the State
agency." 180 The regulations interpret this provision as requiring that:
180. Id. ch. 388-08-150, -160, -170, -180, -190, -200, -210, -220.
181. Id. ch. 388-08-230.
182. Id. ch. 388-08-390.
183. Id. ch. 388-08-40O.
184. Id. ch. 388-08-450.
185. Id. ch. 388-08-470.
186. Id. ch. 388-08-520.
187. There is some evidence that due process is not guaranteed merely by a provision
complying with the express federal standards. A mandamus action has been brought
by welfare recipients in New York, which does comply with these standards, alleging
failure of the state department to adequately provide petitioners an opportunity to
examine pertinent records, and to cross-examine and refute testimony of opposition
witnesses, and the right to advance "arguments without undue interference." Royal
v. Wyman, Civil No. 3237 (S.D. N.Y., filed Aug. 6, 1968).
188. Administrative Procedure Act § 7, 5 U.S.C. § 1007 (1964). "The functions of
all presiding officers . . . shall be conducted in an impartial manner."
189. HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6200 (d).
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The person conducting the hearing shall not have been con-
nected in any way with previous actions or decisions on which
the appeal is made. For example, a field supervisor who has ad-
vised the local agency in the handling of a case would be dis-
qualified from acting as the hearing officer.10
The necessity for a truly impartial hearing officer is strongly empha-
sized by the federal regulations. Because these rules permit the states to
separate the function of hearing officer and final hearing authority,
there are additional provisions designed to insure that the hearing
authority will have had no previous participation in the decision. The
federal regulations provide that the hearing authority may be either the
highest executive officer of the state agency, or a panel of agency
officials, or a hearing officer appointed for that purpose, but that "no
person who participated in the local decision being appealed will par-
ticipate in a final administrative decision on such case." 191
The clear intent of these provisions is that the hearing authority shall
not have been directly or indirectly connected with the agency action
which the claimant is appealing. ' Although this provision may be
FIGURE 12-IMPARTIAL HEARING AUTHORITY
States Violates
Which Insufficient No Provision or Unde-
Comply Provision at All Restricts termined
Number of
States 21 9 17 0 3
Percentage 42% 18% 34% 0 6%
190. Id. 6400(e). Note also that this interpretation is reiterated elsewhere in the federal
regulations, lending credence to the view that it is intended to be given substantial
emphasis. "The impartial official (or officials) of the State agency who is responsible
for conducting the hearing [cannot be] involved in any way with the action in ques-
tion." Id. 6300(h).
191. Id. 6300(g).
192. The regulations specify the kind of practices which are prohibited and those
which are permissible. HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6400(f) provides:
[A] state board member who has participated as a county board member
or in another capacity in the local action on a case [should] disqualify him-
self from rendering a final decision on the particular case. This does not
preclude the State director or administrative board from signing the de-
cision in the name of the State agency, even though previously involved
in the case.
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difficult to fulfill in some jurisdictions, the mandatory requirement is
clear, and compliance by the states is necessary.
Less than one half of the states administering public assistance have
regulations which insure that the hearing officer and final authority will
be impartial, and removed from the decision under appeal. (See Fig.
12 supra.) The remaining states either have no provision at all or have
provisions which do not meet the standards prescribed by the federal
rules.
Those states which comply with the federal rules193 have similar pro-
visions establishing the basic requirement that hearings be conducted
by an impartial official of the state agency, and providing interpretative
regulations which provide that no person who has participated in the
decision being appealed can participate in the conduct of the hearing or
in the final administrative decision.94 The nine states with insufficient
provisions have varying regulations governing the hearing authority. A
typical example is the Arizona regulation which provides that any
person designated as the hearing officer "may disqualify himself on an
individual appeal if in his opinion prior knowledge of the case might
prejudice him in his conduct of the hearing." '9' Common to all these
regulations is the omission of a mandatory requirement that the hear-
ing officer be impartial, and provisions for his removal if he has
prejudicial prior knowledge. There is a significantly large number of
states whose regulations by ignoring the federal mandate, have failed
to insure impartiality in the conduct of the hearing and the final ad-
ministrative decision.
P. Exclusive Record Clause.
Because the federal regulations permit the states to separate the func-
tions of hearing officer and final hearing authority, it is necessary to
make sure that the hearing process will not be subject to external pres-
sures and influence between the hearing and the rendering of the final
decision. To insure that information not presented at the hearing does
not become available to the final hearing authority, the federal regula-
tions provide that "[t]he hearing officer's (or panel's) recommenda-
tions shall be based exclusively on evidence and other material intro-
193. For a list of states which comply with the impartial hearing officer requirement,
see Appendix infra.
194. E.g., CoNNErcu-r PUBLIC AssisTANcE MANUAL vol. I, § 6300(7), 6400(4) (1968).
195. ARIzoNA MANUAL oF PUBLIC WELFARE § 3-1207.3 (A) (1967) (emphasis added).
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duced at the hearing." 19' The regulations specify in some detail what
constitutes the only information available to the decision making
authority. The Handbook states:
The verbatim transcript of testimony and exhibits, or an official
report containing the substance of what transpired at the hearing,
together with all papers and requests filed in the proceeding, and
the hearing officer's or panel's recommendations will constitute
the exclusive record for decision by the hearing authority and
will be available to the claimant at a place accessible to him or his
representative at any reasonable time.197
The provision specifically prohibits the hearing authority from having
access to any secret report prepared by the county department or the
hearing officer himself. The decision must be based solely on the record
of the hearing, and the hearing officer's recommendations, and both of
these must be made available to the claimant if he requests them.
FIGURE 13-EXCLUSIVE RECORD CLAUSE
States Violates
Which Insufficient No Provision or Unde-
Comply Provision at All Restricts termined
Number of
States 17 9 20 0 4
Percentage 34% 18% 40% 0 8%
Although compliance with this provision is necessary to the preser-
vation of due process in the welfare hearing, only one-third of the
states have enacted regulations which specify that the hearing authority
will have available for its decision only the exclusive record of the
case which is also made available to the claimant.1'8 The remainder
either have provisions which do not prohibit other information from
being used by the hearing authority, 199 or have no regulation at all
governing the record for decision.09
196. HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6200(1). The exclusive record requirement is a new one in
the federal procedure. It was first required for the states on Feb. 8, 1968.
197. Id.
198. For a list of states which sufficiently comply with the exclusive record clause,
see Appendix infra.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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The fact that only a few states comply with this provision does not,
in itself, demonstrate that the final decision by the hearing authority is
based on information other than that introduced at the hearing. How-
ever, unless a state has such a provision, the opportunity will remain for
the decisional authority to obtain a more complete explanation of any
questions or issues raised during the hearing from the hearing officer or
the local office.20 1
Q. Retroactive Payments and the Prior Hearing Regulation.
It has become well established in both state and federal administrative
procedure that due process requires that notice, and an opportunity for
a hearing, be afforded an aggrieved individual prior to effective ad-
judicative decision. °2 However, until recently the federal hearing regu-
lations were silent as to the time that the hearing had to be held. The
only federal provision regarding action prior to a hearing specifically
condoned a prior termination by specifying that payments retroactive
to the date the incorrect action was taken had to be made in cases where
there was a decision in favor of the claimant.03 It is not surprising, there-
fore, that the universal practice in all states is for the local agency to
terminate aid by ex parte decision, and then, after notifying the
claimant of the termination, to inform him that the administrative
hearing process is available.
The fact that all states terminate assistance prior to the hearing, and
that the federal regulations required only that retroactive payments be
201. In Michigan, a state with no exclusive record provision, the hearing authority
contacts local officials in order to clear up points of confusion in relation to the record
or testimony. It is exactly this kind of seemingly innocuous extra-record communica-
tion that the federal regulations are designed to prohibit. Interview, supra note 127.
202. Where the regulatory statute is silent on the question of a prior hearing, and
the proposed agency action involved substantial deprivation, federal courts have held
that due process requires a prior hearing. E.g., CAB v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 367 U.S.
316 (1961); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49 (1950); United States v.
Illinois Central R.R., 291 U.S. 457 (1934); Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 99-101
(1903); Standard Airlines v. CAB, 177 F.2d. 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
The trend in state law has been similar. E.g., Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273,
380 P.2d 136 (1963); State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 95 N.W.2d 6 (1959); Bechler v.
Parsekian, 36 N.J. 242, 176 A.2d 470 (1961); Texas Dep't Pub. Safety v. Hamilton, 304
S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd per curiam, 306 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. 1957).
203. HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6300(g). This provision as to retroactive payments is rela-
tively new, having been first transmitted to the states in 1968. Prior to this, the federal
procedure required only that the states provide payments up to 2 months before the
hearing decision regardless of the actual amount of time involved. See HANDBooK Pt.
IV, 6400(i) (Sept. 9, 1965).
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made, led to a number of challenges of the practice on due process
grounds. °4 Partially in response to these actions, H.E.W. promulgated
regulations making federal participation available for "payments or
assistance continued pending a hearing decision." 205 It was not, however,
until a New York District Court in Kelly v. Wyman °6 ruled that
such practice was unconstitutional that definitive action was taken by
the federal agency toward providing the protection already available
in other administrative agencies. In Kelly the court held that "due
process requires an adequate hearing before termination of welfare
benefits, and the fact that there is a later constitutionally fair proceeding
does not alter the result." 207 Subsequent to this decision, H.E.W.
issued, in November, 1968, a proposed regulation208 providing that:
When a fair hearing is requested because of termination or re-
duction of assistance, involving an issue of fact, or of judgment
relating to the individual case, between the agency and the appel-
lant, assistance 'will be continued during the period of the appeal
and through the end of the month in 'which the final decision on
the fair hearing is reached.20 9
The new regulation which became effective on July 1, 1969, amounts
to a clear recognition by the federal agency that the fair hearing re-
quirement cannot be truly effective if persons are deprived of the
necessities of life while awaiting the hearing.
Though perhaps not broad enough to cover all cases in which re-
spondents are entitled to a hearing, the regulation is sufficiently in-
204. Among those challenges filed in various states are: Wheeler v. Montgomery,
No. 48303 (N.D. Cal, April 19, 1968); McCullough v. Terzian, No. 379011 (Sup. Ct.
Cal., May 2, 1968); Kelly v. Wyman, Civil No. 394/68 (S.D. N.Y, May 17, 1968);
Shaefe v. Wyman, Civil No. 864/68 (S.D. N.Y., May 17, 1968); Williams v. Gauly, Civil
No. GC 6728 (N.D. Miss., June 9, 1967); Lage v. Downing, Civil No. 7-2089-C2 (S.D.
Iowa, Oct. 30, 1967); Moore v. Houston, C.A. No. 104435 (Cir. Ct. Mich, Nov. 1,
1968); Park v. Dawson, Civil No. 1408 (Cir. Ct. Kv., Oct. 11, 1968).
205. HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6500(b).
206. Civil No. 394/68 (S.D. N.Y., Nov. 26, 1968).
207. Id. The court reached the constitutional question, rather than basing its de-
cision on the requirement of the "fair hearing" provision of the Act, because several
of the plaintiffs were receiving state "general assistance" and not federal categorical
assistance. See also Moore v. Houston, C.A. No. 104435 (Cir. Ct. Mich., Nov. 1, 1968)
where the court held that due process required a "hearing prior to cancellation of the
constitutionally protected privilege of receiving aid to dependent children if eligible."
But see Park v. Dawson, Civil No. 1408 (Cir. Ct. Ky., Oct. 11, 1968) where the court
rejected the claim of a right to a prior hearing.
208. 33 Fed. Reg. 17853 (1968).
209. Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 11: 291
WELFARE HEARING PROCESS
clusive to encompass the great majority of appealable decisions.210 The
state agencies must notify a client in advance of a planned termination
or reduction. If the claimant then decides to appeal, the agency must
hold the hearing and render the final decision within sixty days (see
sub-section R infra). During this period, until final decision is reached,
the agency must continue assistance. If there are delays beyond the
sixty-day period caused by agency action, illness of the recipient, or
other essential reasons, payments must still be made.21
It is too early to predict whether or not the states will readily comply
with the prior hearing regulation, but an analysis of the state regula-
tions concerning the existing retroactive payments requirement may
prove predictive of the future performance of the states on the more
far-reaching prior hearing provision.
Less than one half of the states presently comply with the much less
demanding federal requirement covering retroactive payments,2' 2 while
the majority either have insufficient provisions, 13 no provision at all, 214
FIGURE 14-RETROACTIVE PAYMENTS PROVISION
States Violates
Which Insufficient No Provision or Unde-
Comply Provision at All Restricts termined
Number of
States 23 6 15 3 3
Percentage 46% 12% 30% 6% 6%
210. U.S. DEP'T oF -EW, Release No. V57 (Nov. 30, 1968). The regulation applies
to disputes which arise over issues of either fact or judgment relating to the eligibility
or amount of entitlement of a recipient. It seems, therefore, that it does not cover
various other grounds of appeal recognized by the federal regulations, including de-
cisions related to restricted or protective payments (HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6300(c) (3) (iii)),
or conditions of payments, such as work requirements (Id. 6300(c) (3) (iv)). It seems
broad enough to cover consideration of the agency's interpretation of the law and of
agency policy promulgated thereunder, at least insofar as it relates to eligibility or amount"
of payment.
211. U.S. D'r oF HEW, Release No. V57 (Nov. 29, 1968).
212. See Appendix infra for a list of complying states.
213. In the case of those states with insufficient provisions, the main failing is that
the state provisions limit the retroactive payments to the period of the two months
preceding the hearing request, regardless of the amount of time that actually transpires
between the date of the incorrect action and the request. E.g., KENTUcKY PUBLic As-
SISTANcE MANUAL OF OPERATIONS § 4243 (1968); IowA DEPARTmENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE
MANUAL VI-13-2 (3) (1966). See Appendix infra.
214. See Appendix infra.
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or expressly restrict or violate the federal rule.215 Because the existing
retroactive payment requirements have only been in effect since Febru-
ary, 1968, it might be argued that the states have not had sufficient
time to enact complying regulations. However, a number of states have
revised their hearing requirements in the interim without enacting regu-
lations which comply with the federal standard. In any event, many
states continue to ignore the clear federal command relating to retro-
active payments, and consequently, there is little reason to believe that
these states will, in the near future, enact regulations to provide for a
hearing prior to termination or reduction, especially in view of the fact
that this requirement entails greater expense, and more detailed admin-
istrative procedures than did the former.
R. The Sixty-Day Rule.
Significant before the enactment of a prior hearing regulation, and of
continuing significance subsequent to its enactment, is a provision estab-
lishing some reasonable time limitation on the hearing process, from
request through final administrative decision. For a long time the federal
regulations relied on a requirement that the states set a reasonable and
definite time limit within which the hearing had to be completed. 210
However, this provision did not serve to guarantee that the hearing
process in the various states was completed without unreasonable delays.
Consequently, H.E.W. issued revised regulations which expressly pro-
vide that "[p]rompt, definitive, and final administrative action will be
taken within 60 days from the date of the request for a fair hearing.
The claimant will be notified of the decision, in writing, in the name
of the State agency .... ,',17 The sixty-day time limit is not subject to
permissible extensions "except that where the claimant requests a delay
in the hearing in order to prepare his case or for other essential reasons,
reasonable time is given and such extra time may be added to the 60
days." 218
215. Arizona, Illinois and Nevada have provisions which are in violation of the federal
requirements. ARIZONA MANUAL OF PUBLIC WELFARE § 3-2107.4 (1967) provides that
the state department "may order payments to be made for all or any part of the
period in which the appeal was pending." (emphasis added). This clearly makes such
payments discretionary with the state agency.
216. HANDBOOK pt. IV 6200(f) (Sept. 9, 1965): "Prompt, definitive, and final ad-
ministrative action will be taken on every request for a hearing, including a time limit
between the request for a fair hearing and the rendering of the decision."
217. HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6200(j).
218. Id. 6300(e).
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The purpose of the sixty-day rule is to provide the assurance of
"prompt, administrative action." 219 The regulations suggest that detailed
controls of individual steps in the hearing process "such as: time limits
for accepting, forwarding, and acknowledging a request for a hearing,
notice to the claimant, and date of the hearing will facilitate proper
administration of the hearing process." 220 What the rule requires of the
states is beyond question. They must provide the administrative
machinery necessary to process a hearing through a final and binding
administrative decision within sixty days of the request. The provi-
sion is equally clear that no delays or extensions can be initiated by the
state agency through pressure brought to bear, either directly or in-
directly, on the claimant. The requirements are clear, and unequivocaf,
and compliance by the states is relatively easy to measure.
FIGURE 15-THE SIXTY-DAY RULE
States Violates
Which Insufficient No Provision or Unde-
Comply Provision at All Restricts termined
Number of
States 27 3 10 7 3
Percentage 54% 6% 20% 14% 6%
Although a majority of state regulations comply with the federal sixty-
day rule,22' a significant number of states have insufficient provisions, no
provision at all or provisions which expressly violate the federal stand-
ards. (See Fig. 15 supra.) Of these non-complying states, the largest
number are silent as to any over-all time limit,21 or have provisions
which permit unauthorized extensions of the sixty-day period at the
option of the state agency.2 3 A major cause for concern, however, is
the relatively large number of states whose hearing regulations spe-
219. ld. 6400(g).
220. Id.
221. See Appendix infra.
222. Id.
223. The three states with insufficient provisions are Connecticut, Illinois and Missis-
sippi. Their common failing is the provision for unauthorized extension of the 60 day
limit. E.g., ILLINOIS CATEGORICAL AssIsTANcE MANUAL § IV. art. I, Rule 1.22 (1963):
"The decision of the Commission shall be rendered in writing within 60 days after the
date of the filing of the appeal unless additional tine is required for a proper dispo-
sition of the appeal." (emphasis added).
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cifically violate the federal requirements.z 4 In most cases, the regulations
in those states specify a time limit much greater than the sixty day
period stipulated by the federal agency.22
The sixty-day rule plays a significant role in insuring that recipients
are not denied due process in the hearing because of unreasonable delays
in reaching a final decision.226 Compliance by the states is essential; the
fact that nearly one half of the regulations do not approach the federal
standard raises more doubts about the efficacy of the fair hearing as it
exists today.
S. The Binding Effect of Decisions on Local Agencies-The Publication
and Distribution of Hearing Decisions.
In any administrative agency, where authority is divided between
state and local bodies, a decision by the state agency is of little conse-
quence unless compliance with that decision by the local agencies can
be assured. For the individual claimant, the sole concern is securing
compliance with the decision of the state hearing authority by his own
local welfare office. If, however, questions of general policy are resolved
during the course of a hearing and subsequent decision, it is also sig-
nificant that all other local agencies are apprised of the decision, and
the necessity of their compliance with it. The Handbook attempts to
secure state-wide enforcement of hearing decisions by providing that:
Decision by the hearing authority, rendered in the name of the
State agency, will be binding on the state and local agency. The
224. See Appendix infra.
225. E.g., OREGON SPWC STAFF MANUAL vol. II, ch. XI, § 2970.5 (1963), provides that
the hearing shall be conducted within two months; NEVADA PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL
§ 04-04-0000-0 (1967), provides for holding the hearing up to 60 days following the
request.
226. Interview, supra note 127. One of the central problems in prosecuting welfare
appeals is the lengthy delay before the hearing is held, and final decision is rendered.
In Michigan, which has no provision for an overall time limit, the hearing is usually
not held until at least 60 days after the request has been filed, and the final decision
follows some time thereafter. Furthermore, the prior hearing regulation does not
entirely solve this problem because it does not apply to the claimant merely receiving
or applying for welfare. It applies only to restrictions, curtailments or terminations
on existing grants.
In addition to the situation in Michigan, the excessive time problem has been such
that class actions have been filed in a number of states challenging this failure to comply
with the federal requirements. E.g., Sprayberry v. Dulaney, Civil No. 11662 (N.D. Ga,
filed March 19, 1968); Lage v. Downing, Civil No. 7-2089-C-2 (S.D. Iowa, filed Oct. 30,
1967); Royal v. Wyman, Civil No. 3237 (S.D. N.Y., filed Aug. 6, 1968).
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State agency 'will establish and maintain a method of informing,
at least in summary form, all local agencies of all fair hearing
decisions by the hearing authority, and the decisions will be acces-
sible to the claimants, their representatives, and the public .... 227
This regulation attempts to achieve two central objectives. First, by
providing that the decision will be binding on the local agency, it
requires that the state agency be responsible for making sure that the
decision is enforced. The regulations permit various methods for
achieving this end, including a report by the local agency to the state
department confirming the action taken to carry out the hearing de-
cision, or a follow-up investigation by the state department officials. 28
Whatever method is used, the decision must be enforceable in the
locality. Secondly, the regulation, by requiring the publication and dis-
tribution of hearing decisions, establishes sufficient state-wide notice to
both claimants and the public, to guarantee that the decision will be
of equal force and effect in all the localities within the jurisdiction. It
provides the degree of policy continuity necessary for claimants to pro-
perly prosecute an appeal from any local office in the state.
The binding effect provision, if enacted by the states, will insure
uniformity of decision and policy throughout the jurisdiction of the
state agency. Without this uniformity, no state hearing process can be
said to fully comply with the requirements of due process.
FGoURE 16-THE BINDING EFFECT AND THE PUBLICATION OF
HEARING DECISIONS
States No Violates
Which Insufficient Provision or Unde-
Comply Provision at All Restricts termined
No. of
The Binding Effect States 27 0 19 0 4
of Decisions
% 54% 0 38% 0 8%
No. of
The Publication of States 12 2 31 1 4
Hearing Decisions
% 24% 4% 62% 2% 8%
227. HANBOOK Pt. IV, 6200(c) (emphasis added). The latter part of this provision
dealing with the publication and distribution of hearing decisions is relatively new,
having been first transmitted to the states on Feb. 8, 1968.
228. Id. 6400(g). Although various follow-up procedures are permissible under the fed-
eral rules, the regulations clearly provide that "[riemanding the case to the local unit
for further consideration is not a substitute for definitive and final administrative action."
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An examination of the state provisions governing the force and
effect of hearing decisions reveals a significant failure to comply with
either objective of the federal regulations. (See Fig. 16 supra.) Thirty-
eight percent of the states lack provisions governing the effect of de-
cisions on local agencies, 229 while sixty-two percent have no provision
which would permit the publication and general distribution of the
hearing decisions.2 30 Although only a small number of states have
insufficient or violative provisions,231 full compliance with the federal
mandate is restricted to a bare majority in the case of the essential bind-
ing effect clause,23 2 while less than one-fourth have enacted regulations
providing for the publication of the hearing decisions.2 33
The significance of the failure of a substantial number of states to
enact regulations which would establish the required federal procedures
is reflected in the experiences of many claimants with uniform decision-
making within the different states. In some jurisdictions, because of a
lack of adequate controls between the state and local offices, policy
changes due to hearing decisions often do not filter down to the local
agencies, and there is no established system for effecting their implemen-
tation.23 4 In other jurisdictions, the failure of the state agency to proper-
ly publish hearing decisions has been the basis of mandamus actions
challenging this lack of compliance with the federal rules.235 The evi-
dence indicates that failure to comply with the binding effect provisions
is the cause, in a number of cases, of a substantial deprivation of the right
to a fair hearing guaranteed by the Social Security Act.
229. See Appendix infra.
230. Id.
231. Maine and Wyoming have insufficient publication clauses which fail to provide
full accessabilty of the decision to the claimant and the general public. E.g., WYOMING
PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL Vol. I., § 558 (1968).
232. See Appendix infra.
233. Id.
234. Interview, supra note 127. Mr. Stewart relates a personal experience in which
one of his clients succeeded in having an established policy decision reversed in a
hearing. The change was reflected in that particular county, but the policy was never
changed in the other local offices throughout the state.
235. E.g., Little v. Montgomery, No. 592396 (Sup. Ct. Cal., filed June 26, 1968);
Robinson v. Board of Commissioners, Civil No. 3399-66 (D.D.C. July 12, 1967). (The
court granted claimant's motion with respect to "any and all written decisions, from
the date of commencement of the substitute policy through the present time, made by
Hearing Officers . . .in appeals where an application was denied or assistance is con-
tinued.)
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T. Opportunity to Examine the Official Record.
Subsequent to the hearing it is often necessary for the claimant to
refer to portions of the testimony and exhibits, especially if he con-
templates taking his case into the courts for review. A significant aspect
of the hearing process is the open accessability of the official record.
The federal regulations protect this right by providing that:
The record of the proceedings at the hearing, which constitutes
the official record, is to be made available to the claimant or his
respresentative to examine if he desires. If any additional material
is made a part of the hearing record, this, too, would be made
available.230
This provision requires the states to retain a complete copy of the
official record, to acquaint the claimant with his rights to examine it,
and to make it readily and freely accessible should he request to do so.
Compliance with the requirement is not difficult, and requires only the
enactment of the appropriate regulation authorizing complete access
to the official record by the recipient or his representative.
FIGUPM 17-OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE THE OFFICIAL RECORD
States Violates
Which Insufficient No Provision or Unde-
Comply Provision at All Restricts termined
Number of
States 42 0 4 0 4
Percentage 84% 0 8% 0 8%
Although the opportunity to examine the official record is not as
essential to the preservation of the fair hearing process as are other pro-
visions, it is significant that an overwhelming majority of the states have
complied with the federal requirement.23 7 Only four states fail to pro-
vide for a full opportunity for the claimant to have full access to the
official record. 38 Recognizing the limitations of a broad conclusion,
the fact that such a large proportion of states have achieved full com-
pliance indicates that when the state agencies desire to do so, they have
236. HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6400(h).
237. For a list of states which have provision for examination of the official record,
see Appendix infra.
238. Arizona, Florida, Hawaii and Maine have no provision for examination of the
official record. See Appendix infra.
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little difficulty in enacting the provisions required by federal law. As
a consequence, non-compliance with the other regulations cannot be
attributed in any major respect to the inability of the state agency to
enact the appropriate regulations. It would seem, from the point of view
of the state agencies, that the crucial fact is not the question of enact-
ment, but the amount of disruption caused by compliance, and the
perceived ability to successfully continue with non-compliance.
U. Notice of the Right to Judicial Review.
One of the basic elements of the administrative fair hearing is that
the decision will be subject to judicial review. Ordinarily, such right
of review is to a court of record whose function is limited to a de-
termination of whether the decision of the hearing authority was
reasonable in light of the facts as found by the hearing officer; whether
the decision was within the statutory authority of the agency; whether
it was based on substantial evidence; and whether it embodies a cor-
rect interpretation of case law or statute. Because the availability of
judicial review of state administrative decisions is dependent solely on
the relevant state law, the federal hearing regulation cannot specify
state judicial review as a mandatory requirement of the hearing process.
However, judicial review of welfare hearing decisions is available in
most of the states administering public assistance. Although only a few
states expressly provide for state judicial review of welfare hearing
decisions,2 state court review is generally available either by virtue of
state administrative procedure legislation or through judicial principles
controlling review of administrative action.
The purpose of the federal regulations, therefore, is not to require
that state judicial review be made available, but to insure that any
review which may be available subsequent to a welfare hearing be
clearly brought to the attention of the claimant at the time the final
decision is announced. Thus, the Handbook provides that at the time
the claimant is notified in writing of the decision of the hearing au-
thority he must also be notified "to the extent it is available to him,
of his right to judicial review." 240
The federal regulations recognize that in some states the right of
review may be specifically prescribed by statute, while in others the
claimant may be able to invoke judicial review on the showing that
the agency action was "unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious." The
239. E.g., CAL. WELFARE AND INST'NS CODE § 10962 (West Cure. Supp. 1968).
240. HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6200(j).
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content of the right to review will depend upon the nature and extent
of the remedy available in the given state.2 41 Regardless of this fact,
the regulations are clear in compelling the states to provide clear, ade-
quate, and timely notice to the claimant of the exact nature and extent
of his right to a further review of his case in the state court.
FIGURE 18-NOTICE OF THE RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
States No Violates No
Which Insufficient Provision or Unde- Review
Comply Provision at All Restricts termined Available
Number of
States 21 1 22 1 3 2
Percentage 42% 2% 44% 2% 6% 4%
An analysis of the state regulations indicates that only a small num-
ber of states specifically provide that no judicial review of welfare
hearing is available. 242 Consequently, compliance with the federal regu-
lation is possible in most of the jurisdictions. Despite this, less than
one-half of the state agencies have provisions requiring that the notice
of the decision also contain a detailed explanation of the claimant's
right to state judicial review. 4 3 Most of the remaining states have no
provision at all relating to notice of this right, while several have in-
sufficiently detailed statements,"' or regulations, which are more re-
strictive than the federal requirement.2 45 (See Fig. 18 supra.)
In order to comply, the states must not only indicate that judicial
review is available, but they must also specifically require that the
claimant be promptly notified of this fact. The Connecticut regula-
tions, for example, provide that it is the stated responsibility of the
hearing officer to explain to the appellant "his right to appeal to
241. Id. 6400(i).
242. E.g., Omo PUBLIC AssIsTANcE MANUAL. ch. 1200, § 1230 (1968): "The decision is
binding on the appellant, the state and local agencies and is not subject to judicial
review." WEs VIRGINIA FAMILY SERVIcE MANUAL ch. 700, § 760 (1969): "There are no
... provisions under the West Virginia Code for judicial review in matters regarding
the receipt of public assistance."
243. See Appendix infra.
244. E.g., VIRGINIA PuLac AssisrANcE MANUAL Vol. II, § 220.1 (1968). The Virginia
manual provides that "the actions of any administrative boards are subject to judicial
review," but there is no provision for notice of this fact to be given to the appellant.
245. E.g., MINNMSOTA PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL VIII, § 6435 (1964).
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the [state] Circuit Court if he is not satisfied," 246 while the New York
rules make clear that in the letter transmitting the decision of the hear-
ing authority to the claimant, "clear reference shall be made [as to
the] availability of judicial review. "247
If the federal notice requirements are not enacted by the state agen-
cies, it is reasonable to assume that few, if any, welfare hearing au-
thorities take it upon themselves to notify the claimant of his right to
judicial review. Since a majority of the states have no provision re-
quiring notice of review, claimants in those jurisdictions are unaware
of the right they have to take the hearing decision to a higher authority.
Even in those states with explicit notice requirements, some claimants
have questioned the established procedure which allegedly interferes
with the full opportunity to obtain review.248 This evidence supports
the conclusion that the remedy of judicial review, though available in
almost all of the states, is not an effective safeguard in many jurisdic-
tions because of the lack of adequate notice to the aggrieved claimant.
V. The Necessity for an Attorney and the Representation Require-
ment.
One of the widely disputed questions concerning the welfare hear-
ing process, concerns the role of the attorney in the hearing procedure.
Most welfare administrators maintain that because state welfare agen-
cies are designed to aid the recipients, the presence of an attorney
tends to transform the hearing, originally designed as a review of an
agency's decision, into a full adversary proceeding in which the state
agency is placed in opposition to the claimant who ultimately suffers
as a result.24"9 The attorney is viewed by many as a "non-professional"
who, untrained in the essentials of social work, tends to disrupt rather
than assist the fair hearing process.'5° On the other hand, many com-
246. CoNNlEcrIcTrr PUBLIC ASSISTANCE MANUAL vol. I, P-6080(14) (1968).
247. NEW YoRuc PUBLIC ASSISTANCE MANUAL 111, 1 (2), Rule 84.16 (1968).
248. In Frederick v. Schwartz, Civil No. 12759 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 18, 1968), the
claimant contended that the Connecticut statutes which require payment of a $7 fee
prior to filing an appeal from a welfare hearing decision deprived him of due process
and equal protection because of his financial inability to pay.
249. See, e.g., H. LEYENDERHER, PROBLEMS AND POLICY IN PUBLIC ASSlSTANCE 269-90
(1955); Handler, supra note 45; Sparer, The Role of the Welfare Clients Lawyer,
12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 361, 362 (1966); Interview, supra note 127.
250. Interview, supra note 127. There is a definite feeling that the hearing process
is properly viewed only by professionals in social work administration as a proceeding
in which all parties are seeking to help the claimant. Attorneys, by making demands,
disrupt this process and antagonize workers and administrators.
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mentators take the position that, in the absence of counsel, it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for the welfare claimant to secure the full bene-
fit of the rights to which he is entitled.251 Because of recent federal
regulations, the dispute has become largely academic. However, the
fact that serious doubts are entertained about the efficacy of legal
representation by welfare workers and administrators, indicates po-
tential conflict with the federal policy requiring the states to bring
legal counsel into the structure of the hearing procedure.
Until recently, the federal regulations left the question of the pres-
ence of counsel to be settled by the state agencies, requiring only that
the states afford the claimant sufficient notice of his right to counsel
should he desire it. However, in spite of the contrary view of many
state agencies, H.E.W. adopted the position that the presence of an
attorney is, in many instances, a necessary adjunct to the fair hearing
process. The federal rules now provide that:
In many instances the recipient's position can best be presented
by an attorney. In order for the claimant to obtain an attorney,
legal fees may need to be provided by the State. Federal financial
participation is available in meeting the cost of these fees. States
are urged to provide payment for the services of an attorney,
or refer recipients to attorneys otherwise available in the com-
munity, because of the skill and knowledge of the legal profession
in these mattersY 2
Because of the generally negative view of the state agencies toward
the presence of attorneys in the welfare hearing, it is not surprising
that this permissive regulation has had a negligible effect on state policy.
The fact that federal financial participation (amounting to 75% of the
total cost) is available to provide legal fees for appellants who desire
counsel but cannot afford it, has not prompted a single state to enact
the necessary provisions making such fees available.
With regard to the second clause of the regulation which recom-
mends, as an alternative, a policy of referring appellants to community
legal services, the response of the states has been similarly disappoint-
ing. Only five states have enacted regulations requiring the local agen-
cies to refer claimants to available legal services. 53 Since such services
251. Harvath, supra note 6; Reich, supra note 35; Note, supra note 172, at 485-89.
252. HANDnOOK pt. IV, 6400 (a).
253. Delaware, New York, North Carolina, Ohio and Wyoming make some provision
for referral to legal services. E.g., NEw YoRK PUBLiC AssisrAwc- MANUAL IV(B) (4),
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are available in most jurisdictions it is clear that the states are not pro-
ceeding to voluntarily integrate the attorney into the hearing process.
In fact, thirty-seven states have no provision with respect to legal ser-
vices to aggrieved individuals, 254 while several states have provisions
which specifically discourage the local offices from making the services
of counsel available to the claimant.255
Due to the apparent failure of the existing regulations to provide
meaningful legal services to the welfare recipient, H.E.W. proposed,
in November, 1968, the establishment of a full-scale legal services pro-
gram by the states.2 56 The new regulation embraces two separate pro-
posals. First, the states are strongly urged to establish a legal services
program with federal funds available for this purpose.2s7 The proposal
contemplates the establishment of a comprehensive range of legal ser-
vices for public welfare clients with problems in the fields of domestic
relations, consumer law, landlord and tenant relationships, etc.255 The
legal services program, although strongly recommended by the federal
agency, is not binding on the states. The option is left to them whether
or not to provide legal services, or the extent to which these services
vill be made available. 59
The second part of the new provision has a much greater impact on
the hearing process. Effective July 1, 1969, the new federal regula-
tions provide that the states must make available the services of legal
counsel to welfare clients who desire them in public welfare hearings
under the fair hearing requirements of the Social Security Act.260 The
impact of the representation requirement cannot be overemphasized.
If the states comply with this mandatory provision, the presence of an
attorney in the welfare hearing will be an accomplished fact. The
federal regulations do not specify the manner in which the states must
Rule 358.6 (1968): "The social services official . . . upon the request of the appellant
for legal counsel to assist him in the fair hearing, shall refer the appellant to community
legal services available for such purpose."
254. See Appendix infra.
255. E.g., MINNESOTA PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL, VIII, § 6422 (1964); OKLAHOMA
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL § 546.71 (1968).
256. State Letter No. 1053, Principles for a Program of Legal Services for Public
Welfare Clients (Nov. 8, 1968).
257. Id. "We strongly urge [the states] to move ahead as quickly as possible to
establish legal services programs. Justice delayed is justice denied."
258. Id.
259. Id. Federal financial participation in the cost of legal services is available at the
rate of 75 percent.
260. Id.; 33 Fed. Reg. 17853 (1968).
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go about making such representation available to all hearing claimants.
However, whatever the method employed, they are forbidden from
supplying such representation from attorneys on the staff of the agency
or under full or part-time retainer by it. The independence of the
attorney to represent his client's interest must be assured. 261
The mandatory representation requirement conclusively settles the
dispute over the propriety of legal representation during the hearing.
The stated policy of the federal agency with which the states must
comply is that the presence of an attorney during all stages of the
welfare hearing is a necessary and proper aspect of the fair hearing
requirement. It remains to be seen to what extent the states will com-
ply with the provision, in view of the obvious reluctance to provide
such services voluntarily in the past. The analysis of the other hearing
requirements, which are similarly mandatory on the states, has indicated
that many states do not enact complying regulations even when the
federal agency requires them to do so.
The regulation does not require an attorney everytime an adverse
decision is reached, but only if a fair hearing is requested by the re-
cipient. Consequently, even if the states do comply with the new pro-
vision by enacting the appropriate enabling regulations, the problem
remains of notifying a client of his rights, and inducing him to appeal.
The question of the administration of the hearing process, particularly
the role of the caseworker, becomes even more significant. The case-
worker is the means by which the claimant is informed of his rights
under the fair hearing requirements. If the worker fails to properly
administer the regulations, assuming the state has enacted them, the
new regulations will be of little effect. A study of this aspect of the
hearing process is, therefore, an even greater necessity if the repre-
sentation provision is to be meaningful to the welfare recipient.
W. The Due Process Requirement.
The preceding sub-sections have analyzed the specific federal re-
quirements governing the fair hearing procedure. These regulations
261. The federal provisions specify that:
It is expected that the services will be provided through purchase ar-
rangements by the public welfare agency. The priority method is the
purpose of legal services from an existing community legal assistance service.
. . . In the absence of an existing community service, the welfare agency
may wish to explore with local bar or other groups the possibility of
creating such a program.
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establish a complete and detailed series of procedures which serve to
guarantee aggrieved individuals the fair hearing established by the So-
cial Security Act. The federal regulations, however, are not confined
to a mere enumeration. of specific requirements. They also provide
that "It]here is 'due process' in program administration affecting the
right to public assistance." 262 This provision serves to emphasize that
in addition to the specific federal requirements, the states are also bound
to observe the requirements of due process in the administration of
the hearing procedure.
What due process requires in an administrative fair hearing is far
from clear. Due process is not a concept capable of exact definition.
It has been stated by one court that "due process embodies the dif-
fering rules of fair play, which throughout the years, have become as-
sociated with different types of proceedings." 263 If this is the case,
then the well-accepted standards governing the administrative hearing
which were examined earlier, 0 4 must at least be the basis of due process
in the welfare hearing procedure.
From the viewpoint of the state regulations, two relevant considera-
tions are involved: it is essential for the states to recognize that their
hearing procedures are subject to the requirements of due process; more-
over, the administration of the hearing process must implement this
policy by providing those procedures essential to such requirement.
FIGuRE 19-DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT
States Violates
Which Insufficient No Provision or Unde-
Comply Provision at All Restricts termined
Number of
States 7 0 39 0 4
Percentage 14% 0 78% 0 8%
Of the participating states, only seven have enacted provisions which
recognize that the hearing process is subject to the requirements of due
process. The remainder are silent, having no provision incorporating this
important principle.266 It can be argued, of course, that express recogni-
tion of the due process principle by the states is not essential to the
262. HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6400(b).
263. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
264. See Section II supra.
265. For a list of complying and non-complying states, see Appendix infra.
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enactment of the necessary hearing procedures. However, the analysis
of the federal requirements and the extent of state compliance lends
credence to the assertion that in many of the states the established
hearing procedures do not comply with the federal requirements. It
is clear that not only do many states fail to state that their hearing
procedures are subject to due process, but a large number have failed
to enact the necessary regulations which would insure that the hearing
process comports with the federal standards which are deemed to com-
prise administrative due process.
X. Suwmmary.
The purpose of the preceding examination of the federal hearing
regulations has been to determine the exact nature of the mandatory re-
quirements, and the degree to which the states have complied with
these requirements. Previous legal analysis has focused primarily
on making such constitutional guarantees as due process and equal
protection applicable to the fair hearing process-hence the extended
argument over the "right" to welfare payments. Such considerations
are, no doubt, valuable in other areas of public assistance, but for the
purposes of the welfare hearing, they are merely speculative and un-
necessary. Rather, as this analysis has demonstrated, the federal hear-
ing regulations, with the addition of the new representation and prior
hearing provisions, go as far as any previous concepts of "due process"
or "equal protection" in guaranteeing each claimant a fair hearing. Al-
though certain aspects of the federal regulations require revision, the
framework that is established provides all the procedures necessary for
full and complete control of unreasonable, discriminatory or restrictive
agency decision making.
In practice, however, the hearing process as it exists in the various
states does not adequately serve its required purpose. A comparison
of the state regulations with the federal requirements indicates that the
problem lies not in the content of the federal requirements, but in the
fact that the states, on the whole, fail substantially to comply with
these requirements. The most significant object of inquiry in this area
is to establish the reason existing procedures are ignored by the states.
To accomplish this objective, it is first necessary to examine the state
regulations in their entirety, i.e., to assess the provisions they actually
contain. Though this has been accomplished in some measure in the
preceding discussion, the concluding section will attempt to more fully
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describe the various procedures the states provide, and to isolate those
areas where their omissions are most significant.
IV. THE STATE HEARING REGULATIONS: AN AssESSIMENT
A. State Regulations-The Common Denominator.
Although it is now possible to make some substantial judgments about
what the state regulations do not provide, it is also significant to ob-
tain some kind of a generalized view of what they do provide. What
elements of the hearing process are common to all, or nearly all, of the
state provisions? The state regulations are all based on the premise that
the state agency must establish some form of appellate procedure
whereby claimants can appeal agency decisions on the local level and
obtain an authoritative review at the state level.2-06 All states have ac-
cepted this responsibility, and have enacted regulations which establish
a framework for the initiation and prosecution of a welfare appeal.
To this extent, at least, a state level hearing is available in some form
in all jurisdictions. The nature of that hearing, and the provisions en-
acted to govern administrative actions, vary substantially from state
to state, but, regardless of the inequities and inequalities of the exist-
ing procedure, the basic framework exists in all jurisdictions for the
establishment of an effective hearing process.2 67
Having taken the initial step of creating an appellate process within
the agency, the states have all promulgated regulations which establish a
minimum procedure designed to implement that goal. Reducing the
state procedure to a universal level produces a common denomina-
tor of protection and recognition of the rights of welfare recipients.
Common to all the states are provisions which recognize the right of
the individual claimant to the "traditional" grounds of appeal, specifi-
cally, the right to appeal agency decisions regarding eligibility, amount
of assistance, the manner and form of payments, conditions of pay-
ments and the failure of the agency to act with reasonable expediency
on a claim for assistance.2"a Although these provisions serve to permit
266. See HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6200(a).
267. This is perhaps a more significant statement than it seems. Because the Social
Security Act allows the states the option of having either a state administered system,
or a locally administered system with state supervision, a number of states have chosen
to permit their categorical assistance programs to be locally administered. Conse-
quently, the establishment of a state level hearing process, in these states is a significant
first step in creating a fair hearing procedure. See HEW RPoRT, supra note 68.
268. HANDBOOK pt. IV, 6300(c) (1), (3).
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a. limited accessibility to the fair hearing by recognizing the right of
all recipients to appeal certain agency decisions, they do not assist
claimants desirous of challenging agency policy and interpretation of
the law. Unfortunately, the policy appeal, perhaps the single most
significant grounds for appeal, has received minimal recognition by the
states 69 Thus, the average claimant must remain content with pro-
cedures which provide recourse solely from error in decision-making
at the local level.
In addition to a general recognition of a limited right to appeal,
all states have some elemental form of notice requirement. 70 Although
full notice to the claimant of his right to a hearing and to representa-
tion is not universally provided, the regulations do specify that some
form of notice must be given. However, the only universally recog-
nized notice is that provided on the application forms, and in the
brochures distributed to prospective recipients during the intake proc-
ess. Although this limited form of notice does exist in all localities, and
serves, in some measure, to fulfill the purpose of informing the claim-
ant of his right to a hearing, it is doubtful that the applicants receiving
this kind of notice have a full understanding that this right exists.271
The state regulations recognize that there must be some established
procedure whereby claimants can request, through the local office, a
state level review of the decision. Request provisions are common to
almost all the states,272 but in many a mere expression of a desire to
appeal is insufficient to initiate a hearing. Rather than providing full
access to the hearing, the state provisions often require that formal
written demands be submitted before a request will be transmitted to
the state agency. The only common ground among the states with
respect to request provisions is that all have a procedure which the
269. A central criticism of existing state hearing procedure is the failure of the
state to provide for a review of agency policy and interpretation through the hearing
process. There seems to be an administrative tendency to use existing policy to justify
the action rather than to use the situation to question policy. Wedemeyer & Moore,
The American Welfare System, Tim LAW OF THE POOR, 1, 18 (1966).
270. Eighty-six percent of the states have some kind of notice requirement. See
Figure 2 supra.
271. See Briar, Welfare from Below: The Recipient's View of the Public Welfare
Systen, TbE LAw OF THE POOR 46, 54-55 (1966). Briar's study indicated that 60 percent
of the recipients felt they had not been informed about the right to appeal. It is Briar's
contention that they probably were given some form of notice but that it didn't
register on them. Id. at 55.
972. Ninety percent of the states have some kind of request procedure. See Figure
3 supra.
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local agency must follow in processing demands. Although there is
some advantage to formal procedure that insures uniformity and dis-
courages official irresponsibility, the restrictive nature of these provi-
sions limit the freedom of the appellant to demand a hearing.273
Another element common to most of the states is the recognition
that the claimant must be allowed a reasonable time to appeal the agency
decision.274 Although not all the states have established time limits
within which the claimant may file a request, only one state has enacted
limits which are clearly unreasonable. Perhaps more significant is the
general provision of some form of informal complaint procedure where-
by adjustments can be made short of a formal appeal.275 However, this
procedure, at its lowest common denominator, does not include state
level participation in complaints nor an opportunity for claimants to
respond to adverse action in advance. The complaint procedures com-
mon to all the states consist merely of a process whereby a recipient's
dissatisfaction can be referred from the welfare caseworker to an
administrator. It does not include a procedure for review of the de-
cision in question at either the state or local level. In this form the
complaint procedure appears merely as an attempt to pacify the claim-
ant in order to avoid a formal appeal.276 Without an established policy
of decisional review with recipient participation, the existing procedure
cannot be said to add to the effectiveness of the hearing process.2 77
A significant common ground of state regulation is the provision for
the convenience of the claimant in setting the time, place, and date of the
hearing.7  This is not to say that all states provide for the convenience
of the claimant to the degree required by the federal regulations. How-
ever, most states give it some recognition in scheduling the hearing. Un-
fortunately, for many welfare recipients, this is simply not sufficient to
273. Interview, supra note 127. Mr. Stewart states that a number of welfare claimants
have reported to him that, although they orally requested an appeal, when they were
given a written form to complete they failed, for a variety of reasons, to undertake the
effort necessary to submit the form, and thus an appeal was never instituted.
274. Sixty-four percent of the states have estab!ished periods of time for an appeal
ranging from 30 days to 3 months. Although a number of states are silent with respect
to the time limit for an appeal, only two states have limits which are clearly unreason-
able. See Sub-section F supra.
275. Seventy-six percent of the states have some form of established complaint pro-
cedure. See Figure 4 supra.
276. Caseworker Interview.
277. Wedemeyer & Moore, supra note 269.
278. Eighty-six percent of the states have some provision that the convenience and
needs of the claimant are to be given at least some consideration. See Figure 8 supra.
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overcome their financial and physical handicaps. Their needs often re-
quire primary and mandatory consideration if they are to be able to at-
tend and fully present their case without substantial sacrifice °.27 This kind
of consideration is not common to the states, and that which is pro-
vided is not sufficient to fulfill the goal of an open and fair hearing to
those who desire it.
Common to all the states is a uniform procedure by which a hear-
ing request is to be considered withdrawn or abandoned.5 0 In general,
the procedures provide that no withdrawal can be considered unless
it is made by the claimant himself or his representative. Although this
does serve to protect appellants, to some degree, from arbitrary ad-
ministrative action in terminating appeals without their permission, the
fact that not all states require withdrawals to be in writing means that
applicants are not provided adequate protection against pressures to
abandon an appeal."' It is commonly established that no appeal can be
considered abandoned unless the appellant fails to appear at the desig-
nated time and place for the hearing. However, all regulations do not
provide a procedure whereby the agency is required to make a further
effort to determine the reason for the claimant's failure to appear.
Therefore, although established abandonment procedures provide
some protection against official malfeasance, they fail to make sufficient
allowance for his inability to present his case at the designated time
and place.
The preceding provisions have involved procedures which govern
the conduct of the hearing process prior to the hearing. Procedures
relevant to the hearing itself are also found in all state regulations.
Not all of the states have rules of procedure which serve as adequate
guidelines during the hearing, but there is universal recognition of
certain basic rights to be made available to appellants.2 2 Those rights
which are common to nearly all the states are: the examination of docu-
ments and records to be introduced at the hearing; the presentation
of the case by legal counsel; the introduction of witnesses; the oppor-
tunity for the claimant to establish his own case, and to question or re-
279. Welfare Administrator Interview.
280. Although 90 percent of the states have some established regulation governing
withdrawal and abandonment of hearing requests, many have regulations which fail
to adequately protect the claimant from administrative pressure. See Figure 10 supra
and accompanying text.
281. Id.
282. Ninety-six percent of the states have established regulations which guarantee
the claimant some basic measure of rights at the hearing. See Figure 11 supra.
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fute other testimony.283 The common rights granted by all states do not
go as far as the federal regulations require. Some states restrict the
claimant's right to cross-examine agency witnesses, to advance argu-
ments without interference, and to examine all documents and records.2
4
The regulations in general fail to establish uniform and detailed hearing
procedures, and to recognize that the hearing is subject to the require-
ment of due process. 2 5 At best, they provide a minimum of procedural
safeguards necessary to full review of the decision. Without the more
detailed and explicit procedures necessary for the claimant to fully pre-
pare and present his case,2so the hearing is subject to confusing testi-
mony, conflicting findings, and an inadequate record for decision.287
State procedures generally establish some definite time limit between
request for a hearing and final administrative action.288 The time limits
that have been established, however, do not, in many cases, approximate
the federally accepted standard. 2s As a consequence, although some
limits do exist in most states, and are a factor in preventing arbitrary
agency action, the fact that, generally, they are unreasonably long,
means that full protection is denied the recipient.
The final provision common to the state regulation is the opportunity
granted to the appellant to examine the official record subsequent to
the hearing.290 This opportunity is available only upon specific request,
and generally must be made at the state or local office. Although this
is a safeguard against arbitrary action subsequent to the hearing, it is
significant primarily because it enables the claimant to prepare any
further appeal that he may desire to take in the courts.
These provisions constitute all the regulations which are common
to the state hearing regulations. In most instances they fail to provide
sufficient protection to the welfare appellant. Further, many procedures
283. With few exceptions these comply with the federal requirements in HANDBOOC
pt. IV, 6200(i) (1)-(6).
284. See Figure 11 supra and accompanying text.
285. Id.
286. Interview, supra note 127. Mr. Stewart attributes the inability of appellants or
their attorneys to adequately argue their case to the lack of uniform rules of procedure,
which causes confusion and inconsistent judgments.
287. Id.
288. Eighty percent of the states have some provision which provides a time period
within which the agency must act. It should be noted that a number of these specifically
violate the federal 60 day standard. See Figure 15 supra and accompanying text.
289. Id. notes 223, 225 supra.
290. Ninety-two percent of the states provide for this right to some degree. See
Figure 17 supra.
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are omitted from this common base entirely. The common denomi-
nator of state regulations does not include any procedure for the:
publication and distribution of hearing procedure; prior examina-
don of documents; prohibition of non-record information; estab-
lishment of an independent medical assessment where necessary;
guarantee of an impartial hearing officer and hearing authority; estab-
lishment of an exclusive record for decision; provision for retroactive
payments, or payments pending the outcome of the hearing; enforce-
ment of hearing decisions in all localities; publication of hearing deci-
sions; right to judicial review of the final administrative decision; and
recognition of the need for due process, and the services of counsel dur-
ing the hearing.
This list of omissions serves to substantiate the previously postulated
thesis that the state regulations, taken as an entity, do not, at their
lowest common denominator, provide more than a few elemental pro-
cedures governing the hearing process. Without the remaining pro-
cedure, deemed, by the federal agency at least, to be necessary to the
hearing process, there can be little doubt that the states provide in-
sufficient protection to the claimant against arbitrary, unreasonable or
unlawful administrative action, as well as an insufficient opportunity
for full access to the hearing process, and full review of agency deci-
sions. At this common level, the judgment must be made that the state
regulations deny claimants the effective fair hearing which they are
granted by federal law as a matter of right.
If, taken as a whole, the states have failed to enact the necessary
regulations to provide even a minimal amount of protection and recog-
nition necessary for a fair hearing, the question remains whether, indi-
vidually, some states approach this standard.
B. The State Regulations: An Individual Profile.
After examining what the states as a whole provide, it may no longer
be surprising that no state participating in public assistance complies
in full with the federal requirements. There are a total of twenty-seven
federal requirements. It might be argued that some of these, though
admittedly mandatory on the states, are not absolutely essential to an.
effective fair hearing. To meet this argument the following analysis
will focus on the states individually, not only in relation to the full
range of federal requirements, but also with respect to certain "es-
sential" provisions.
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FIGuRE 20-PROFILE OF STATE HEARING REGULATIONS
A B
STATE PERFORMANCE BASED ON STATE PERFORMANCE BASED ON
ALL TWENTY-SEVEN FEDERAL TWELVE "ESSENTIAL"
REQUIREMENTS REQUIREMENTSI 
-
STATE E - 00 = STATE ',5 " 0--
0. E~ E 8H 0
N.M. 21 77% 2 0 4 Wyo. 9 75% 1 0 2
Wyo. 20 74% 4 0 3 Conn. 9 75% 0 1 2
Maine 20 74% 1 0 6 Ohio 9 75% 1 0 2
Conn. 20 74% 1 1 5 N. Car. 8 67% 1 1 2
Wash. 19 70% 0 0 8 N. Mex. 8 67% 0 0 4
Ohio 19 70% 2 2 4 Wash. 8 67% 0 0 4
Colo. 18 66% 1 0 8 Alaska 8 67% 2 0 2
N.C. 18 66% 5 1 3 Ark. 7 59% 3 1 1
Alaska 18 66% 3 LITERAL 6 Colo. 7 59% 1 0 4REIN CT,
Del. 17 63% 2 0 8 Del. 7 59% 2 0 3
Hawaii 17 63% 2 0 8 Hawaii 7 59% 1 0 4
Texas 17 63% 1 0 9 Maine 7 59% 0 0 5
Mo. 17 63% 0 0 10 N.Y. 7 59% 0 0 4
R. I. 16 59% 3 0 8 Miss. 7 59% 0 1 5
Montana 16 59% 1 0 10 Mon. 7 59% 0 0 5
N. Y. 16 59% 1 2 8 Texas 7 59% 1 0 4
Ark. 16 59% 5 1 5 Utah 7 59% 0 0 5
La. 16 59% 2 2 7 Okla. 6 50% 0 0 6
Miss. 15 55% 3 0 7 Va. 6 50% 2 1 3
W. Va. 15 55% 2 0 10 W. Va. 6 50% 1 0 5
Ky. 15 55% 2 0 10 R.I. 6 50% 2 0 4
Utah 15 55c 1 0 11 Cal. 6 50% 2 0 4
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FIGumn 20-PROFILE OF STATE HEARING REGULATIONS-CONNUED
A B
-~= = -= 0 0 52 =2N=
STATE a STATE 1 E-
1%. 2.0 I
CLC CL. oO. cc ~ ~ 0
Okla. 15 55% 0 1 11 Md. 5 42% 1 1 5
Tenn. 15 55% 1 2 13 Mo. 5 42% 0 0 7
Ga. 14 52% 0 0 9 Oregon 5 42% 1 0 6
N.J. 14 52% 1 1 11 Penn. 5 42% 0 1 6
Va. 13 48% 5 2 7 Tenn. 5 42% 0 0 7
Md. 12 44% 3 1 11 La. 5 42% 1 1 5
Oregon 12 44% 3 2 10 Ga. 4 33% 0 0 8
S. Dak. 12 44% 3 3 9 Mich. 4 33% 0 1 7
Mass. 11 41% 2 0 14 N.J. 4 33% 0 0 8
Cal. 11 41% 2 1 13 N. Dak. 4 33% 1 1 6
Minn. 11 41% 0 3 13 S. Dak. 4 33% 2 1 5
S. Car. 10 37% 6 0 17 Ky. 3 25% 2 0 7
Mich. 10 37% 1 2 14 Mass. 3 25% 0 0 9
Ala. 10 37% 3 3 11 Minn. 3 25% 0 2 7
Idaho 9 33% 3 0 15 S. Car. 3 25% 0 0 9
Kansas 9 33% 2 0 16 Arizona 2 17% 1 1 8
N. Dak. 9 33% 3 2 13 Idaho 2 17% 2 0 8
Nevada 9 33% 1 2 15 Indiana 2 17% 1 0 9
Penn. 9 33% 2 3 13 Iowa 2 17% 1 0 9
Indiana 7 26% 1 0 19 Kansas 2 17% 2 0 8
Iowa 7 26% 1 0 19 Neb. 2 17% 0 1 9
Fla. 7 26% 5 1 14 Nevada 2 17% 0 3 7
Neb. 7 26% 0 1 19 Fla. 1 8% 4 0 7
Arizona 7 26% 3 2 15 Illinois 1 8% 0 1 10
Illinois 5 19% 3 1 18 Ala. 1 3 25% 1 3 7
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To determine whether any of the state regulations provide a suffi-
cient procedural framework to insure the effective operation of the
hearing process, it is necessary to first establish a standard by which
each state's performance can be measured. The primary criteria for
assessing the state regulations must be the federal requirements as
promulgated in the Handbook. Even if these requirements were not
mandatory on the states, they would still serve as the most clearly de-
veloped statement of those regulations that are necessary to provide
welfare claimants a fair hearing. Any state whose provisions parallel
the federal rules will have a sufficient basis from which an effective
appellate process can be administered.
An analysis of individual state provisions, however, provides con-
clusive evidence that none of the states has reached, or even approached,
conformance with the federal rules (see Fig. 20 supra). In varying de-
grees all fall short of meeting the necessary test of compliance with the
full spectrum of federal requirements.291 It seems obvious, however,
that the probability of a claimant receiving a fair hearing is greater
in those states whose regulations more nearly reflect the federal stand-
ards than in those where the federal guidelines have been largely ig-
nored. In addition to measuring state performance on the basis of de-
gree of compliance, it also is necessary to take into consideration
whether they make some provision, albeit insufficient,292 or whether,
instead of mere omission, they have enacted provisions which specifically
restrict or violate the federal requirements. 293 By taking all these fac-
tors into consideration it is possible to establish a continuum of per-
formance by each state. This ranges in relatively uniform increments
from the highest level of performance achieved by the New Mexico
agency, compliance with 77% of the federal requirements, to the lowest
point, marked by the Illinois agency at only 19% compliance (See Fig.
20 supra). However, the only valid judgment that can be based on this
analysis is that the procedure in New Mexico comes substantially closer
to insuring a fair hearing than does the established procedure in Illi-
nois. In the absence of any indication of the provisions that are omitted
or restricted in any given state, and their relative importance to the
291. See Appendix infra.
292. It is impossible to establish an arithmetic rating of the states based on the
number of insufficient provisions rather than complete omissions. Consequently, the
procedure has been to indicate that such differences do exist which should be used
in any consideration of the effectiveness of any state procedure. See Figure 20 supra.
293. The differentiation that is to be given to a state which has a restrictive provision
.opposed to one with no provision at all is a matter of individual judgment. The fact
is merely noted to enable a complete judgment to be made. See Figure 20 supra.
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hearing process, it is impossible to determine whether the regulations
of any of the states provide an adequate minimum procedure.
In order to provide a basis for judgment about whether any state
procedures provide an acceptable minimum of protection, though fall-
ing short of full compliance, it is necessary to identify those provisions
which are essential to the establishment of a minimum level of effective
protection of the fair hearing process. Using the standards for adminis-
trative hearings that prevail in other agencies,"' and considering the
special needs, and situation of the welfare appellant,295 certain provi-
sions can be identified which provide a minimum acceptable procedural
protection.
A number of essential provisions are necessary to insure free access
to the fair hearing. The first is one establishing the nature, and extent of
the notice given to claimants of their right to a hearing. To be effective,
the regulations must provide: 1) that the claimant is notified of his
right to a hearing; 2) that he is notified of his right to representation
during the hearing; and 3) that he is given a full explanation of these
rights.296 A further essential requirement is a provision permitting the
claimant to challenge agency policy, and interpretation of the law. It is
common administrative procedure to permit interested parties a hear-
ing prior to substantive rule making" 7 Since the welfare process does
not provide for such procedure, it is essential that the claimant be al-
lowed to question policy or agency rules during the hearing process.28
A provision establishing a simple and non-restrictive request procedure is
required because of the special liabilities and handicaps common to
many recipients2 99 It is here that regulations are most necesary for
control of arbitrary agency behavior, and, in the absence of a provi-
294. See Section II supra and accompanying notes.
295. The fact is that welfare claimants' realization of the availability of the hearing
process, knowledge of its procedures, and willingness to prosecute an appeal, is of a much
lower degree than is found in most individuals aggrieved by agency action. See Briar,
supra note 271.
296. Federal and state agencies recognize that adequate notice is essential to the
administrative hearing. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act § 5 (a), 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (a)
(1964); REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT § 9(a)-(b). The notice
requirements in the welfare hearing must, necessarily, be more stringent than the com-
monly accepted procedure because of the lesser degree of comprehension, and viability
of the administrative process peculiar to the welfare claimant. See Briar, supra note 271.
297. Administrative Procedure Act § 3(2), 5 U.S.C. § 1003(2) (1964). "In case of
substantive rules, opportunity for oral hearing must be granted...
298. Wedemeyer & Moore, supra note 269.
299. A reflection of the unwillingness of many recipients to initiate an appeal is
the fact that any impediments placed in their way, no matter how insignificant, often
serve to discourage exercise of the right. Interview, supra note 132.
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sion that any form of request is acceptable, access to the hearing proc-
ess is unacceptably limited.
There are a number of provisions essential to effective preparation
and prosecution of a fair hearing. No hearing can be said to have an
adequate procedural framework unless it provides for: opportunity
for the claimant to respond to questions regarding his situation prior to
termination; publication of hearing procedures; prior examination of
documentary evidence; establishment of basic rights governing the
hearing itself; effective participation of counsel in the hearing proc-
ess; and continuation of payments pending the hearing (or at least
provision for retroactive payment). These provisions, though in some
instances common to all administrative hearings, are especially required
due to the unique relationship of the welfare claimant to the agency.
Because categorical assistance is initially predicated on need, the claim-
ant is much more limited than other aggrieved individuals in his ability
to seek and retain counsel, as well as to subsist pending the hearing.
Consequently, it is necessary to make provision for advance opportunity
to respond to questions, to provide for legal services, and for con-
tinuance of assistance payments. 00 The provisions requiring full dis-
closure and established hearing procedures are essential to enable a claim-
ant to properly prepare and present his case. Without these safeguards
it is unreasonable to expect a claimant to be able to effectively refute an
agency decision.8 01
Finally, subsequent to the hearing, it is essential that there be some
provision that the hearing decision will be enforced at the local level,
and that compliance is required in all localities. In the absence of this
requirement, the decision is merely a Pyrrhic victory for the claimant,
who remains deprived of his rights by local action.802
These aforementioned provisions are all essential to the welfare hear-
ing process. They establish a minimum of procedural safeguards. The
remaining federal requirements and related standards are significant,
but, arguably, are not essential to guarantee a fair hearing. They serve
primarily to insure the fullest measure of procedural protection. Con-
sidering the essential provisions alone, it can be said that this standard
constitutes the minimum that the state regulations must provide.
Based on this minimum standard it is possible to assess the performance
of the various states. The results of this analysis are not significantly
300. See sub-section Q and V supra.
.301. See sub-section H, I and N supra.
302. Interview, supra note 127.
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more encouraging than was the comparison based on the more rigorous
full federal requirements. (See Fig. 20 B. supra). Despite the fact that
the essential provisions are a minimum level of achievement, none of
the states have enacted sufficient regulations to provide even this degree
of protection. Placing the state regulations on a scale based on com-
pliance with the essential requirements, performance ranges from a
high of 75% by Wyoming0 3 to 8% by Florida and Illinois.304 From
this analysis the conclusion is clear that none of the states provide
sufficient procedures to insure even the minimal amount of protection
necessary to the welfare claimant. Reducing the federal standards to
their most basic essentials does not measurably increase the percentage
of state compliance. It is evident that the omissions found in all the
states, even those who come closest to the federal requirements, are not
failures to enact secondary or supportive procedure, but represent a
failure to enact the necessary essential procedures. Although some states
obviously provide a much greater degree of administrative regulation
than do others, the omissions that exist represent essential prerequisites
to an effective fair hearing.
C. Conclusions and Recommendations.
It has been established that the state hearing regulations are insuf-
ficient to provide an effective hearing process for welfare claimants. 30 5
The question remains as to why no state has complied with the
necessary requirements. Three reasons are suggested: 1) the fed-
eral agency does not exercise sufficient control over the state agencies
nor compel compliance with mandatory regulations; 2) the states do
not have sufficiently well-established rule-maling procedures to enact
the necessary regulations on their own initiative; and 3) since the Act
permits the states to choose between state administered, and locally
administered, state supervised, public assistance programs, there is a lack
of uniformity in state administrative procedure, which further impedes
proper regulatory procedures.
303. The Wyoming provisions fully comply with all the essential provisions except
that there is insufficient notice of the right to an attorney, and a failure to enact any
procedures providing advance opportunity to respond to agency decisions, and for the
binding effect of hearing decisions. See generally WyoMrNG PuBLic WELFARE MANUAL
vol. 1, §§ 550 et seq. (1968).
304. The only essential provision found in the Illinois procedure is the publication of
adequate hearing procedure. ILLINOIS CATEGORiCAL AssisrANcE MANUAL § IV, art. I, Rule
1.01 to 1.26 (1963). The only provision enacted by Florida is an adequate request
clause. FLORIDA MANUAL OF PUB3LIC WELFARE ch. 100, §§ IV-V (1967).
305. See Appendix infra.
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Failure of Federal Control. The inability of the federal government
to compel state compliance is an obvious conclusion based on the fact
that the mandatory federal requirements and state regulations do not
parallel each other. If the federal agency were able to adequately secure
compliance by the states, there would be no need to further investigate
the nature of the state provisions, and the reasons for their failure to
establish adequate procedure. All that would be required would be a
determination of whether or not the federal requirements themselves
were sufficient and adequate to provide a fair hearing. Such federal con-
trol does not exist at the present time. However, even if the federal reg-
ulations do not have practical mandatory effect, they should serve as a
standard for state achievement. Yet the states, although they have fol-
lowed this standard to some degree, have failed to enact comprehensive
requirements which provide the same measure of protection deemed es-
sential by the federal rules. To determine why the states have failed to
use the federal regulations as a model for their hearing regulations, it is
necessary to examine reasons for the states' failure to act which go be-
yond the mere absence of effective federal control.
Insufficient Rule-Making Procedures. The procedures used by ad-
ministrative agencies to promulgate rules and regulations vary substan-
tially with the nature of the regulations, and the agency, whether state
or federal. 0 6 The federal A.P.A. and the administrative procedure
legislation of some states specifically provide for the requirement of
proper notice, and a hearing prior to the promulgation of proposed
rules. " ' This hearing requirement does not, however, apply in all situa-
tions. For example, the Act does not require a hearing in the case of
most procedural and interpretive regulations, or in situations where such
procedures are "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest." 308 The absence of formal hearing requirements for some types
of regulations, and under certain circumstances, does not mean, however,
that administrative rules are promulgated without any extra-agency ad-
vice or participation. In the absence of a formal hearing, it is standard
practice for agencies to depend upon informal consultation with in-
formed or affected individuals, or with other advisory bodies, prior
306. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 124 (1965).
307. Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1964). "[A]fter notice re-
quired by this section, the agency shall afford interested persons an opportunity to
participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views or argu-
ments. . . ." The hearing requirement for rule making is required in Iowa, Massa-
chusetts, Nebraska, Ohio, Virginia and Wisconsin. See K. DAvis, supra note 306, at 125.
308. Administrative Procedure Act § 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(a) (1964).
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to issuing new rules.0 9 Although the standards of rule-making pro-
cedure which prevail in federal or state administrative agencies are
not binding on the welfare agencies, it is instructive to compare these
procedures with those employed by the welfare departments. With
few exceptions, the state boards charged with formulating rules gov-
erning welfare administration in the states have established no formal
procedure prior to promulgation of new or revised rules.3 10 This lack
of formal rule-making procedures is a central reason for the failure
of the hearing regulations to provide sufficient safeguards to guarantee
the effectiveness of the hearing process. In addition to providing a
forum for a full review of those provisions that are required, rule-
making procedure produces the kind of continuity and consistency
absent in the state hearing regulations.
Several of the state welfare agencies have come to recognize the
need for more formalized rule-making procedure, especially with re-
gard to revised hearing regulations. The New York State Welfare
Board, in a departure from past practice, recently instituted public hear-
ings on proposed rules governing fair hearing procedure.31' Pursuant
to this procedure, welfare clients, attorneys, welfare caseworkers, and
administrators, as well as other interested parties, were permitted to
testify before the New York Board. An even more ambitious effort
to provide a more effective process for rule-making has been adopted
by the Washington State Welfare Commission. The state agency has
issued regulations which establish a formal and uniform procedure
under which any interested person may petition the agency requesting
the "promulgation, amendment or repeal of any rule." 313 Following
any such petition, the department, at its discretion, may either: 1) is-
sue a nonbinding declaratory ruling; 2) notify the interested party that
no declaratory ruling is to be issued; or 3) order a hearing for further
argument on the requested action.3 1 4 In addition to the initiation of
309. K. DAvIs, supra note 306.
310. Interview, supra note 127.
311. These hearings were held for the frst time on July 21, 22, 1967. 8 WELFARE:
L. BuLL. 10 (1967); 10 WELFA E L. BuLL. 9 (1967).
312. Id.
313. WASHINGTON PuBIic AssisTANCE c ANuA II § 388-08-540(1) (1968).
When the petition requests a promulgation of a rule, the requested or
proposed rule must be set out in full. The petition must also include all the
reasons for the requested rule together with the briefs of any applicable
law....
Id. § 388-08-540(2).
314. Id. § 388-08-580(1).
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rule-making by interested parties, the regulations also provide for the
promulgation of rules on the agency's own motion. Department initi-
ated rule-making is preceded in most cases by the opportunity for
notification and hearing on the proposed changes. 315 By providing for
this formal rule-making procedure, the Washington agency has estab-
lished at least a basis from which comprehensive and effective hearing
regulations can be enacted. 316
The examples set by New York and Washington, in enacting formal
rule-making procedures, should not be ignored by the other state agen-
cies. The lack of such procedure is a prime reason for the failure of
the states to provide effective hearing regulations. It is not essential that
the rule-making procedures require formal notice and hearing provi-
sions, although, given the nature of the welfare hearing, such provi-
sions would be advisable. What is necessary, however, is that some
kind of procedure be enacted by the state agencies to provide the es-
sential hearing regulations presently lacking in state procedures.
The Method of State Administration. The final factor which ac-
counts, in some measure, for the inconsistent, and inadequate state
hearing regulations, is the variation in the method of state administration
permissible under the Social Security Act. The Act provides that a
state plan must "either provide for the establishment or designation of
a single State agency to administer the plan, or provide for the establish-
ment ... of a single state agency to supervise the administration of the
plan." 317
Given the option under the Act of providing either a state ad-
ministered or a locally administered, state supervised plan of adminis-
tration, twenty-three of the states have opted for the state supervised
plan, while the remaining twenty-seven provide for direct state con-
trol.31 8
Although the hearing regulations of those states with state ad-
ministered programs do not provide the level of procedural safeguard
necessary for the effective administration of the hearing process, they
do provide a substantially greater level of compliance with federal
regulations than do the state supervised programs. 319 For example, of
315. Id. § 388-08-080.
316. It is perhaps no coincidence that the Washington hearing procedures are among
the most comprehensive and adequate of any of the states. See Figure 20 supra.
317. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 302(a) (3) (1964) (emphasis added).
318. HEW REPORT, supra note 68.
319. With regard to all twenty-seven federal requirements, the "state administered"
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the fifteen state programs which most closely approximate the federal
standards, twelve are state administered while only three are state super-
vised plans.3 21 It seems clear that the state supervised programs provide
less effective regulation than do those that are state-administered. That
the state-supervised states are less receptive to federal regulations is due
primarily to the fact that, by permitting decentralized administration,
the federal agency is further removed from influence on the procedures
employed at the local level. Furthermore, the state agency, which
promulgates the hearing regulations, also is more removed from the ad-
ministrative process when it supplies only supervisory functions.
By granting the states the option of local autonomy, the federal act
has created a situation in which the promulgation of effective and
universally applicable hearing regulations is substantially more difficult.
The result is that such regulations often fail to be enacted.
Conclusion. Although the above analysis indicates some of the reasons
for the inconsistencies and omissions in the state hearing regulations, the
essential fact remains that voluntary compliance runs counter to the per-
ceived goals of state welfare agencies. The institutional position of the
state boards is that they want to maximize discretion. One route to this
end is to minimize the need to apply due process standards. Such
standards, therefore, can be uniformly effectuated only through the
promulgation of mandatory regulations supported by effective enforce-
ment procedures. Any attempt to secure compliance short of creating
adequate machinery for the enforcement of federal regulations, will,
of necessity, fall short of the desired goal: to make the welfare hearing
process an effective and efficient means of insuring due process in the
administration of public assistance.
APPENDIX
The following Table provides a comparison of the state hearing
regulations with the federal requirements. The individual state pro-
visions are rated on the following basis: C-Complies with the federal
requirement; I-Insufficient provision; N-No provision at all; R-Re-
stricts or violates the federal requirement.
states have an overall compliance percentage of 50 percent. The "state supervised" states
provide only 44 percent compliance. In comparing performance based on the twelve
"essential" requirements, the "state administered" states have a 45 percent level of
compliance while the "state supervised" states record only a 37 percent compliance figure.
320. See Figure 20 supra; HEW REPORT, supra note 68. Note that four out of the
top five states in terms of compliance with federal requirements have state administered
systems.
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